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who had always lived in the *Quartier Latin* in Paris; Zatonsky and Skrypnik were the first Ukrainian politicians to go over to the Bolsheviks.

This same Committee, on 14 February, two or three weeks after the occupation of Kiev, announced the federation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with 'the All-Russian Republic of Workers and Peasants'. Subsequently, on 9 March, 'according to the Revolutionary order' 'the First Ukrainian Congress of Soldiers', Peasants' and Workers' Delegates' was called together. This body received for approval 'the Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic'. Seven months had not elapsed before nine-tenths of the territory of this first Ukrainian Soviet Republic had fallen into the hands of the Volunteer Army.

In spite of the ephemeral character of the first Ukrainian Soviet Republic it is worth considering the theoretical basis on which this state was founded, since its structure illustrates Lenin's conceptions as to the treatment of nationalities within the Communist State.

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Following the November *coup d'état* two documents were published in Russia which had an 'ideological' importance in relation to the formation of national republics. The first was a 'Declaration of the Rights and Privileges of the Nations Forming Part of Russia'; it concluded as follows:

'According to the Will of the Congress of Soviets, the Council of People's Commissars has decided to adopt as a foundation for its activities in the question of nationalities the following principles:

(1) The equality and sovereign rights of all the nationalities of Russia;

(2) The right of self-determination of all these nationalities, including the right to form independent states;

(3) The abolition of all national and religious privileges and limitations;

(4) The free development of national minorities and ethnographic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.'

The document bears the signature of Dzhugashvili-Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, and of Ulianov-Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars.

The second document is a 'Declaration of the Rights of Oppressed Nationalities', dated 24 January 1918 and approved by the 3rd Congress of All-Russian Soviets. The setting up by this Congress of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) was based on the following principles: 'Russia is proclaimed the Republic of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates. The Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of a free union of free

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nationalities as a Federation of Soviet National Republics. Striving to create the really free and voluntary union of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the 3rd Congress of Soviets will limit itself to the establishment of the principles only on which the Federation of the Soviet Republics in Russia will be built, allowing the workers and peasants of every nationality to take independent decisions in their own Soviet Congresses as to whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the Federal Government and other Federal institutions.'

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The Federation, having been accepted by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee in February 1919, was approved by the 1st Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in the following month. It is clear that this declaration remained in force when, after the collapse of the Volunteer movement and the failure of the 'Petlyurians', the Soviets were restored in the Ukraine. And it is a notable fact that, notwithstanding the considerable changes in the constitution of U.S.S.R. which were introduced between the years 1920 and 1936, the Ukrainians together with the other 'minority nationalities' retained the right, in theory, to opt out of the Union. Only at the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, summoned to discuss 'the Stalin Constitution' of 1936, were certain limitations (not included in the published texts of the Constitution) introduced by Stalin himself. 'So that the right [of a Republic] to leave the Union shall not be an ephemeral right it is necessary:

(*a*) that the Republic should not be surrounded on all sides by territories of the Soviet Union, but should lie on its boundaries, because in the opposite case it would be impossible for her to leave the Union;

(*b*) that the population of the Republic should not be less than a certain minimum, because in the opposite case she would not be able to defend herself against the attacks of Imperialist beasts of prey;

(*c*) that in the population one nationality should form a compact majority.'

During the years 1921–2 the Ukrainian Soviets were otherwise engaged than in studying constitutional questions. The liquidation of the Volunteer Army in the Crimea and the suppression of the numerous bands of the *atamans* prolonged the period of warfare and the Red Armies terrorized the exhausted countryside. Many towns were becoming deserted, and vast stretches of land were left fallow by a peasantry which had neither the courage nor the security to sow or to reap. Black typhus decimated the destitute population, and in the winter of 1920–21 a serious famine developed which became worse during the spring and summer months. Although the

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conditions for peaceful labour had somewhat improved, since the war had come to an end and only reprisals and 'the settling of accounts' were going on, the weather contributed to make the new harvest catastrophically poor. The absence of any sort of organization but that of the police and the army, and the general exhaustion of the economic structure of Russia, produced conditions which were unparalleled in modern history. European charitable organizations, with all the goodwill in the world, proved inadequate to cope with the calamity. In the Ukraine it is estimated that not less than three million people died from hunger or from diseases resulting from it. Incredible horrors formed a background to this human tragedy; there were, for instance, numerous cases of cannibalism authenticated.

The ruin of the famine; the naval mutiny in Kronstadt with all its formidable implications; the stubborn armed struggle of the peasantry against the Soviet régime in the Tambov and adjoining Governments—all these factors induced Lenin, himself in 1922 a very sick man, to embark upon the New Economic Policy. It was a compromise between 'the Communism of the war period' and 'small bourgeois elements'—a compromise imposed by the dire necessity of the moment.

The same causes which imposed the New Economic Policy inclined the Soviet leaders towards a policy of conciliation in regard to 'the minority nationalities'. In the Caucasus it had been necessary to concentrate three Army Corps to suppress the insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers of Daghestan during the winter of 1921–2; the Georgian Social Democratic Republic had recently been overthrown as the result of a six weeks' campaign in which four Army Corps were engaged, and the Armenian mountaineers of Karabagh were waging a guerilla war which was only terminated by an amnesty at the end of 1922; in Turkestan the savage Basmachi movement continued to devastate the country until 1926.

The Declaration of 30 December 1922 preceded the formation of 'the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' (U.S.S.R.), the Constitution of which was published on 6 June 1923. This declaration confirmed in a different form the decision of the 3rd Congress of Soviets of 24 January 1918. It affirmed that the U.S.S.R. had been 'constituted by the free and voluntary union of free and equal Socialist Republics'. 'Representation of the different nationalities' in the central organ of government was provided in a kind of 'second chamber' which consisted of 114 members.

In the Ukraine the Bolsheviks were more successful than in Caucasia in recruiting to their ranks many of the former separatists

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who had been associated with the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'. Both parties had their reasons for conciliation. So far as the Soviet authorities were concerned the appearance of prominent non-Bolsheviks in the administration enabled them to improve their relations with the peasantry and to convince them that Lenin's New Economic Policy was indeed, in his own words, 'in earnest and for long'. It does not follow that the peasants had ever been particularly enthusiastic for the nationalist ideology of the *Rada* and the 'Directoria'; but the Ukrainian nationalist leaders, owing to their social origins, were nearer to the peasantry than the men at the head of the various Committees of the Communist Party and the Soviet administration. The latter were either 'new-comers' from the north or representatives of the local Jewish 'intelligentsia' or men drawn from the 'proletariat' of industrial centres. They owed their rise generally to their revolutionary services in the streets of the great cities. The former collaborators of Vinnichenko and Petlyura, on the other hand, were either peasants by origin or they belonged to the typically Ukrainian 'half-intelligentsia' of the countryside.

In encouraging these men to work with the Communist Party, the Soviet authorities did not contemplate allowing them to play a part in the political life of the country, and in this respect they kept them under the strictest control. On the other hand, they were allowed wide scope in the field of 'cultural work', because the Bolsheviks understood that these people would interpret 'cultural work' in the form of hasty 'ukrainization' which in its tendency to supplant the remnants of 'the imperial culture' in the Ukraine would serve purposes which the Bolsheviks themselves had in view. 'Ukrainization' was, in the view of the Bolsheviks, a harmless occupation for the active intellectual element in the Ukraine during a difficult period of transition—an occupation which at the same time would tend to tone down past bitterness and to divert renewing energies into a comparatively harmless channel. In Caucasia, where the Bolsheviks had to do with tougher men among whom the national idea had deeper roots, they were to find that within ten years the same policy was to produce formidable difficulties.

The first to set the example of going over to the Soviets was none other than the patriarch of the Ukrainian movement himself, Professor Hrushevsky, who was rewarded with the Presidency of the newly founded Ukrainian Academy in Kiev. Hrushevsky was followed by the former President of the Council of Ministers of the *Rada* Government, Holubovich, by the General Secretary to the *Rada*, Khrystyuk, and a number of other prominent radicals and separatists.

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231 a high standard of breeding—particularly of draught horses. The Army Remount Department fulfilled a third of its requirements in the south, and there was a considerable export abroad. As a result of the Revolution, breeding suffered probably more than any other branch of rural production. Statistics for 1922 illustrate the disastrous effect of the Revolution on livestock throughout the whole Empire. In 1916 the total head of cattle was about 60 million: in 1922, 23 million. The number of horses in 1916 was estimated at 35 million: in 1922 at 20 million. Sheep numbered 120 million in 1916: 46 million in 1922. In view of the fact that South Russia was the principal field of the Civil War, it is probable that about 50 per cent of the horses and cattle destroyed were lost in this region. It is reckoned that in the Ukraine and New Russia only one-third of the pigs remained and one-quarter of the sheep. Losses in domestic animals are much more difficult to recover than losses in other branches of domestic industry; further, the special conditions of field labour in New Russia required a large proportion of draught oxen and horses.

656 433 One of the principal reasons which compelled Lenin to formulate the New Economic Policy was the necessity of restoring the food production of the Soviet Union.

'"War Communism" and attempts to introduce "integral socialism" into the countryside ended in 1922. At that date began the period of "liberalism" in Communist policy in relation to the villages. The peasantry were allowed freedom in the choice of land labour and almost complete freedom in other economic activities. The years between 1922 and 1929 produced excellent results: the lost sowing area was recovered and breeding was resumed. The food question in the country was improving' (Prof. 113 Markov, *Socialist Economy in U.S.S.R.*, Part 2, *Agriculture*, Paris, 1937). By 1929 agricultural production approached pre-war standards (150–160 million quintals of cereals compared with 200 millions average for the years 1909–13). In spite of the fact that, following the break-up of large estates, the peasants had expanded the sown area at the expense of pasture (and according to the *Ukrainian Encyclopaedia* were showing a diminishing average on arable of 15–20 per cent as a result of more primitive methods of farming), the breeding of cattle and horses was nearing pre-war figures and the production of pigs was improving.

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1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

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had been based. '"Liberal" tendencies began already in 1932 in the sense that *kolkhozniki* (individual members of the *Kolkhozy*) were allowed to keep their own cattle (Decree of 4 February 1932). Subsequently, in 1935, *kolkhozniki* were accorded the right to farm their own private allotments within the boundaries of the *Kolkhozy*.

These modifications in policy soon gave positive results. It is difficult to say whether the *Kolkhozy* have come to be accepted by the peasantry as the permanent basis of rural life. At the same time there can be no doubt that the grant of certain rights of private farming to the *kolkhozniki*, combined with a relatively free market, has tended to a notable improvement in the conditions of peasant life. In consequence food production throughout the whole country has again increased.

There are now four forms of farming in existence side by side in the Soviet countryside:

(*a*) *Sovkhozy* (State farms);
(*b*) Individual farms;
(*c*) *Kolkhozy* (Collective farms);
(*d*) Allotments belonging to the *kolkhozniki* within the area of the *Kolkhozy*.

The relative importance of these different types of farm can be judged from the areas allotted to each in the 'sowing plan' of 1936: *Sovkhozy* covered 16 million hectares; individual farms, 5 million; *Kolkhozy*, 108 million; *kolkhozniki* holdings, 8 million.

Obviously, the *Kolkhozy* constitute the most important source of agricultural production. On an estimated yield of 8·3 quintals per hectare, the *Kolkhoz* pays 1·7 quintals to the state in taxes; 3·3 to the governmental 'machine stations' which provide and maintain plant; the balance goes to the *kolkhozniki*. The *Kolkhozy*, with a sowing area of rather over 100 million hectares and a yield of 7 quintals per hectare, supply the state organizations with about 150 million quintals (approximately 15 million tons) surplus over the consumption of the rural population. This reckoning is, of course, purely theoretical, but, in 1934, when bread rations existed for the town population, the administration did distribute about 10 million tons of bread.

The importance of the *kolkhozniki* (who are allowed to cultivate from ¼ hectare to 1 hectare each) lies in the production of vegetables and fruit and, to a certain extent, of livestock. The Plan for 1937 estimated that individual farmers and *kolkhozniki* possessed 29 million head of cattle as compared with 4½ million owned by the *Kolkhozy* over their vastly greater acreage. The private farmers and

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423 *kolkhozniki* were reckoned to be even richer in pigs, of which they
471 counted 15 million against 5 million on the *Kolkhozy* and an even
433 lesser number on the *Sovkhozy*. The tiny bits of land which belong to the *kolkhozniki* personally, as well as their domestic animals, have become a school of individual farming which has grown up in the middle of 'the Socialist experiment' as a compromise with the dictates of economics and human nature. In twenty-eight towns in 1938, 82 per cent rye flour, 74 per cent wheat flour, 86 per cent beef, 93 per cent milk, 97 per cent eggs, 87 per cent potatoes, and 72 per cent cabbages, were brought to market by *kolkhozniki* and individual farmers, and only the balance came from the state and collective farms. True the official statisticians could find comfort in the fact that as against the general balance of state commerce which amounted to 100 milliards of roubles the free market only absorbed 16 milliards: but the free market shows a definite tendency to grow and in four years has doubled its transactions.

● 656 The successful private initiative of the *kolkhozniki* has already
423 begun to weigh upon the minds of the protagonists of the integral Revolution. In the spring of 1938 a Government Decree proclaimed that 'abuses are observed on those allotments of land which are given over to *kolkhozniki* for the personal cultivation of kitchen-gardens or other domestic needs. These abuses consist in the fact that the allotments are sometimes not situated next to the habitations of the *kolkhozniki*, but lie in the middle of *Kolkhoz* lands and exceed the size allowed by the law. The worst part of it all is that these allotments have become the principal care of *kolkhozniki*, and that they show negligence in the accomplishment of their duties in collective farming. It has also been affirmed that these allotments are sometimes cultivated by people who are not members of *Kolkhozy*. A stop has to be put to this state of things as it leads to the development of bourgeois tendencies. The dangerous influence of *kulaki*, who have succeeded in escaping, is suspected.' As a result of this situation, Stalin, by a Decree of 15 August 1939, ordered a 'verification' of all allotments taken over by *kolkhozniki* for personal cultivation: he took the opportunity to recall the law which provided that such allotments were not to exceed ¼ or ½ a hectare. It was also declared that all allotments in isolated situations in the middle of *Kolkhoz* land were illegal and should be abolished: special attention was directed to *Kolkhozy* lying in the Ukraine and Western Russia. *Kolkhozniki*, whose individual allotments were to be abolished, were themselves to be expelled from their *Kolkhozy* and united in new *Kolkhozy* in regions where 'new land' could be found. For this purpose attention was directed to the lands beyond the Volga, in

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western Siberia, the Altai and the Far East. The execution of Stalin's commands is to be completed by September 1940. It is not to be anticipated that the acute conditions of 1929–34 will be repeated as a result of this new drive against the human nature of the Russian rural masses: the Communist machine has broken the strength of peasant society. At the same time, there is little doubt that the harvest of 1939–40 will not be as abundant as those of 1936–8.

The influence of the Revolution and of the Soviet régime on forestry in the South of Russia has been no less baleful than on other branches of rural industry. At the end of the nineteenth century woods covered 20 per cent of the whole area of the Ukraine; in 1928, according to the most optimistic estimates of Soviet statisticians, they did not occupy more than 7 per cent. Even in such a 'half-steppe' region as Poltava, owing to the care of the Imperial Government and of large landowners, woods had covered 10 per cent of the total area. 'Destruction of forests is one of the greatest evils because it is followed by the formation of deep ravines which drain the district of underground waters. The consequence of the formation of such ravines is that streams carry away valuable soil to the rivers and the sea. Every year thousands of hectares of good black earth are lost to the labourer and only serve to make the Dniepr and its affluents more shallow. The destruction of forests, the formation of ravines, the drying up of underground waters, threaten the future of the Ukraine with the gravest consequences.'

The Soviet Government is well aware of the dark side of its 'achievement' in the agricultural life of the South of Russia. But, as is well known, the Soviet leaders intend to effect a radical change in the balance of productive forces within the Union. Their reasons for this intention are both political and ideological: political because they realize that their dictatorship rests upon the industrial proletariat and has always aroused the antagonism of the peasants; ideological because they are the apostles of the mechanistic conception of life and, hypnotized by the material achievements of the capitalist world, they ape it in their attempt to transform it and can seek nothing more profound than the realization of Stalin's dream 'to catch up and surpass America'.

In 1913 the relation of agricultural to industrial production in Russia was 59·4 to 40·6. Under the original Five Year Plan formulated in 1928 the Soviets aimed at the attainment of a balance which should allocate 80·2 to industry and only 19·8 to agriculture. This fantastic aim was based obviously on the possibilities of bringing into exploitation the vast mineral resources which were known to lie under the soil of the Soviet Union. And all the political ruthless-

payment of a specific amount of tax in kind and left to the peasant the rest of his crop. In an endeavor to get this grain into Russia, the government offered to buy it but it did not have the funds or the inclination to pay for it at the market price. The financial reforms connected with the introduction of the chervonets could, to a certain degree, make it expedient for the peasant to sell to the government for cash, and as time went on the peasant gained the power of selling his crop for cash but the Moscow control of transportation and the prohibition of large scale trading left him helpless and he saw himself forced to dispose of it locally or to the government. Then the government made a fixed price which was far below that of the free market, and was often scarcely a third of the amount that the peasant could have secured. This sale of large quantities of agricultural products at a fixed price gradually became the rule and was one of the signs that the period of toleration for private income was coming to an end.

In 1925, the government began to clamp down on the small traders, the Nepmen, who had profited by the opportunities which they had had. Again it had a large choice of measures. Thus, depending on the situation, it could invoke laws against the hiring of labor; it could order the state agencies to refuse to buy from or sell to an obnoxious individual and thus isolate him; it could suspend his ration cards and perquisites, take away his right of voting and thus make him a pariah in the community; it could levy prohibitive taxes which would put him out of business and confiscate his property; or it could find some violation of some other law or regulation and imprison or exile him.

The degree of pressure which was put upon the peasants and the workers varied from year to year. Each year Ukraine was compelled to export more to Russia without regard to the needs of the local population. Thus, the amount of grain rose from 1,050,000 tons in 1924-5 to 3,165,000 tons in 1926-7, when there was a bumper crop, but in 1927-8, when the harvest partially failed and there were signs of need in the country, the amount collected and exported rose to 4,353,000 tons. At the same time, the continually increasing demands aroused again a spirit of oppo-

CHAPTER NINE

The Five Year Plan

Lenin and the Communists had never made any concealment of the fact that the New Economic Policy was only a passing concession to put an end to the stagnation and demoralization which had resulted from the civil war and the period of Militant Communism. It was not the adoption of a definite plan for the future nor was it a sign of a growing rapprochement with capitalism or a gesture toward the rest of the world, as the partisans of the Soviets abroad tried to make it appear. [185] 656 471 661

With each step of the recovery of the economy of Ukraine and of the Soviet Union as a whole, unobstrusive steps were taken to remove the various concessions which had been made. Year by year, from about 1925, new regulations were introduced by the Commissariat of Finance, one of the All-Union Commissariats which had the definite object of suppressing not only the concessions but of tightening up the restrictions on individual life and preparing the way for socialism and communism. By one device or another, the Nepmen were broken. Now the government forbade the state trusts to sell to them as individual traders either raw materials or finished or semi-finished products. Agreements which had been freely made by the government were either suddenly cancelled or were perverted. Obviously false charges were brought against the various individuals and they were fined exorbitantly or they were arrested and deported. By the fall of 1927 the sector of private trade had been almost completely liquidated and the way was open for the central government to do what it would with the situation.

With the Nepmen disposed of, the way was open for a similar attack upon the wealthier classes of the peasants and those who

656 471 661 [427] had profited by the operation of the Ukrainian land code which, as we have seen, was less rigid than were the similar arrangements in the RSFSR, where the land society was organized far more on the lines of a collective than it was in Ukraine. It was always possible to apply individually any of the laws against the leasing of land or the employment of hired help, for in both cases the provisions had been left vague and indefinite, so that the authorities could act whenever they so desired. As a matter of fact, as one of the first measures the administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic reduced the period on which a lease could be made from thirteen to six years and thus it was easily possible to upset many of the calculations that had been made by the richer and more progressive landowners.

[435] At the same time, the closing of the official markets rendered it possible for the government to force the peasants to dispose of their grain at the officially pegged prices which in the grain-growing districts were considerably lower than they were in the less fertile areas of the north. If this did not produce the desired results, it was equally possible to demand the grain tax in kind and to compel the peasants to turn over, free of charge and under the guise of payments, additional supplies. All these measures, which were introduced in many cases personally and not by districts, caused the peasants to feel themselves becoming steadily more impoverished and less able to resist the demands of the government.

631 442 On the other hand, the All-Union Commissariats which took precedence over those in the individual Soviet republics and which were, in reality, staffed only by Russian Communists, effectively broke the power of the localities or of the republics to have any special voice in the management of their own affairs.[1] This was, in its turn, skilfully explained by stressing the superior requirements of the Union which, on any closer analysis, turned out to be the interests of the Russian area. Thus, at the XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a Russian who was at the time the chief of the Ukrainian State Planning Commission remarked in an unambiguous manner: "It seems to me that we must assign perfectly clear tasks, to emphasize that the national

[1] [1925, during relinquishment of NEP -- Analyst]

626 device was also too obvious, for the new journal continued to
638 criticize the Russian policy and in 1931 it was forced to disband and most of the members who wanted to continue to write passed into the VUSPP, which, with all its rigid adherence to the party line, could not be too sure as to what that party line really was.

At one point in his career Skrypnyk, who was in many ways opposed to Khvylovy, dreamed of the establishment of a Federation of the Unions of Revolutionary Writers of Ukraine. He succeeded in forcing this upon the Futurists and many smaller leftist groups and also the *New Generation,* but his failure to make this real in 1931 was but a sign of the future.

By this time the VUSPP, along with the RAPP, had become the dominating force politically and Skrypnyk was forced to give up his endeavors and to allow most of his Federation members to join the VUSPP. This was but another step in the decay of all literary schools and it reflected the period of uncertainty and of a definite degree of opposition to the domination of the RAPP.

By the end of the twenties, the opportunities for independent thinking in literature had grown exceedingly few and scattered. There were still, in general, only the two currents of Ukrainian and Russian Communism, and the former was definitely beginning to wane under the continual attacks that were delivered both by its opponents and the Communist Party through its official organs.
[186] Still, up until 1931, Ukrainian literature continued to develop and the literary disputes, often over minor points of literature, thought and culture, animated society and lent a zest to the various writings. These now more than ever began to reflect a growing apprehension over the conditions as they were and the impossibility of equating the ideals of Communism and the realities of the Russian domination of the country.

• [656] A more decided blow was given by the decree of April 23, 1932. This ended all literary discussions and abolished all literary societies and groups throughout the entire Soviet Union. In place of these, Stalin announced the establishment of a single society throughout the entire Union, the All-Union Association of Soviet Writers, and turned this over to Maksim Gorky, perhaps the most prominent

The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

433 methods, new possibilities. Their actions were interpreted as merely
185 a defiance of the central government, a new case of wrecking or
● 656 of sabotage and were treated accordingly. In the first rush of collectivization, the network of agricultural centres that had been developed in Ukraine during the twenties as a responsible answer to the local appreciation of the problem was wiped out and most of their leaders paid the penalty for their temerity in standing by their own studies and their own achievements.

[432] There were only the slightest concessions finally made to the peasants. They were allowed to sell a certain amount of the surplus grain to the government at a somewhat higher price. The individual families were allowed to possess about an acre of land on which they could raise their own produce, provide their winter food as a result of their own labors and they were allowed to sell their own produce in what may best be described as a legalized black market, but this meant merely the privilege to sell themselves in some of the larger local centres, and to many of these they were allowed to go only if they secured the appropriate permits from the heads of the collective farms and the local representatives of the NKVD.

[511] Even these slight concessions, while they could not bring prosperity to the peasants on the collective farms, rendered it possible for them to keep body and soul together despite the steadily dropping standard of living and the almost complete lack of consumer goods which were furnished in quantity only to the inhabitants of the more favored regions, as Moscow and Leningrad. At the same time, the peasants felt, ever more bitterly, the fact that the new conditions of living prevented almost all those home manufactures which in the earlier period had enabled them to compensate in some degree for the lack of proper articles of industry.

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626 There was thus a growing material impoverishment of the village communities and a loss of the old spontaneity and gaiety that had marked Ukraine even under the hardest conditions of the past. Attempts were made to utilize this for forcing peasants to leave the villages and join the industrial masses in the cities and work in the new plants. Others were encouraged to leave the

[after 1933 famine + Russification -- Analyst]

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unified Party, should "rule" within each smaller nation which had formed part of the tsarist empire.

Having provided for the initial objective of substantial Communist control, however, the Bolshevik leaders made sweeping statements against "Great Russian chauvinism," and directed that the culture of each nation be "national in form, socialist in content." Encouraged by this apparent desire for development of the national culture at the expense of the Russian cultural supremacy, which had been grafted on their peoples in tsarist days, many of the Communist leaders of the non-Russian nations set about vigorously promoting an independent cultural life as soon as Communist control was established. In the Ukraine, the major leader in the effort during the early twenties was the commissar of education, Alexander Shums'kyi; after his deposition in 1927 he was succeeded by Nicholas Skrypnyk, an even more devoted Communist, but a firm adherent of Ukrainian cultural nationalism.[23] To what extent these men were sincere adherents of Ukrainian nationalism and to what extent the favor they extended to it was motivated by a desire to secure popular support and to curb the overweening power of Moscow in the interest of an internationalism which, to them, was in closer accord with original Communist ideology, it is hard to say. At any rate, they went to very considerable lengths to encourage specifically Ukrainian traits and traditions, especially in scholarship, literature, and the schools. While these Communist supporters of Ukrainian nationalism always formed only one segment of the ruling group in the Ukraine, and hence could not completely eradicate Russian permeation of

[23] No thorough treatment of the Ukraine under Soviet rule exists. Among the best brief analyses in English are John S. Reshetar, "National Deviation in the Soviet Union," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (April, 1953), 162–74; Michael Pap, "Soviet Difficulties in the Ukraine," *Review of Politics*, XIV (April, 1952), 204–32; and an older but generally accurate account by Lancelot Lawton, "Ukraina: Europe's Greatest Problem," *East Europe*, III (Spring, 1939), 28–45. The continuation of Hrushevs'kyi's *A History of the Ukraine* by Professor O. J. Frederiksen, based on notes by Luke Mishuha (Chapter XXV) is also useful, as are more general works on the Soviet system, such as Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), Chapter IV, and Edward H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1950), I, 289–307. The sources are, of course, voluminous and highly scattered. I can claim no special mastery of them, although my limited acquaintance leads me to the conclusions cited in the text, which are approximately those of Reshetar and Pap.

nian Communists who wished to create an independent Soviet Ukraine participated in these uprisings. The policy of the Russian Communists in Ukraine had a clearly predatory character. The Communist Commissar Schlichter said of the tasks of the Soviet Russian campaign at a session of the Moscow Soviet on March 22, 1919:

"You all remember that when Ukraine was becoming Soviet with every day of the advance of the Red Army we became easier in our minds; the rich-in-bread Ukraine is ours! . . . We have four central supply detachments. We set all hopes on them. We have a lot of workers we have sent out who will be able to overflow all Ukrainian villages. We shall always remember that the looks of the proletariat of Russia are turned towards Ukraine" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 2: Kharkov, 1928).

Not only by the ruthless pillage were the Ukrainian people put against the Russian Communist dictatorship; by its nationalist policy, too, it roused great dissatisfaction among the Ukrainians. The Rumanian Communist Rakovsky, who was appointed by Moscow as Premier of the Soviet Government of Ukraine, declared that the Ukrainian language and culture were 'petty bourgeois' and that the use of the Ukrainian language in public institutions was necessary only for 'Ukrainian counter-revolutionaries'.

For this reason the 'dictatorship of the Russian culture' was introduced in Ukraine by the Russian Communists as a 'proletarian' one. "The Soviet Government in Ukraine in 1918 made in fact Russian the official language", — writes the Communist N. Popov in his *History of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine* (1929). Against the declarations of an 'independent Soviet Ukraine', the Rakovsky Government proclaimed the 'federation' of Ukraine with Russia. There could not be free elections to the Soviets in Ukraine. The power in the villages was given to the 'Comittees of Poor Peasants' consisting often of people sent from Russia. According to the instruction these Comittees were given they had the duty — "to fulfil precisely and relentlessly all orders of the supply authorities . . ."

13. Risings in Ukraine

In spring 1919, when the Soviet Army had reached the Dniester River, Moscow prepared its forces for the support of Soviet Hungary. But at that time the same troops who had fought against the Franco-Greek forces under the command of Hrihoriev, Tyutyunnyk and others, started the fight against the Russian Communists. Of the strength of this movement Rakovsky, Premier of

people took place. The Ukrainian Government and Army were forced under the pressure of Denikin to leave the temporary capital of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, the city of Kamenets in Podolia, on November 15, 1919. The Ukrainian Army marched into the hinterland of the enemy. The enormous partisan movement in Ukraine in autumn 1919, stopped Denikin's offensive on Moscow. Of this the Russian Red Army took advantage, broke through the front of Denikin and marched into Ukraine again. The front of the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, brought into disorder by the war with Denikin, could not be restored at once, and the Soviet Russian troops seized almost the entire territory of Ukraine again. 669

When the leaders of the Russian Volunteers saw the coming of their definite defeat, they offered the command of the Ukrainian Army which was carrying on a partisan war against the oppressors of Ukraine, an alliance against the Russian Communists. The delegate of the Russian Volunteer Army, Colonel Popov, wrote in January, 1920, to the Ukrainian Supreme Command: "We have what you want — arms, but you have that we have not — the confidence of the population". The Ukrainians declined this offer of the Russian 'Whites' convinced that any alliance with them would bring only damage to the Ukrainian struggle for liberation.

The Army of the Ukrainian Republic began its 'Winter-Campaign', famous in the history of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation, in Lubar in Volhynia on December 6, 1919. This army, by order of its Government, made partisan war on the territories of Ukraine against 'White' and 'Red' Russia until May 5, 1920. Only leaning upon the confidence and the active support of the population could this army cover distances of thousands of miles carrying the banner of the independent democratic Ukraine. The want of equipment did not allow the Army of the 'Winter Campaign' to accept in its ranks many thousands of Ukrainians who wished to fight actively for the independent Ukraine.

16. The New Tactics of the Russian Communists in Ukraine

The failure of the Soviet Russian policy in Ukraine in 1919 caused much discussion among the Communists themselves. By order from Moscow, in October 1919, not only the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine', headed by Rakovsky, was abolished, but also the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Among the Communists who had worked in Ukraine in 1919 a group of the so-called federalists appeared that demanded from Moscow more rights for Ukraine. The leader of this group, 656 ● 182 668

656 G. Lapchinsky, explained that Ukraine must be an independent state
186 and not a Russian colony.
668 The powerful Ukrainian movement forced the Russian Communists to alter for a certain time their tactics in Ukraine. The Soviet Russian Government ordered the Communists to pay attention to the national peculiarities of Ukraine. In December 1919, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution on the recognition by Russia of the independent Soviet Ukraine. Among other matters this resolution states that the "members of the Communist Party in Ukrainian territory are obliged to realise the right of the working masses of learning their mother language in schools, and speaking it in all Soviet institutions".

The resolution recommends the restriction of the requisition of food from the Ukrainian peasants. Besides, this resolution of the Russian CP pointed out that the principal task of Soviet construction in Ukraine was the requisition of arms from the population.

The President of the Soviet Russian Government, Lenin, wrote in *The Letter to the Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Occasion of the Victory over Denikin* on January 4, 1920:

"The independence of Ukraine has been recognised both by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and the Russian Communist Party. Only the Ukrainian workers and peasants themselves can decide the question on their Soviet Congress — whether Ukraine should be united with Russia or left an independent Republic... We want a voluntary union of nations, a union that would not permit violence of one nation against another".

All these declarations of the Russian Communist Party leaders had the aim to lull the vigilance of the masses of the Ukrainian people. In reality the Soviet Russian Government did not even intend to change its imperialist course against Ukraine. Moscow feared the armed Ukrainian people and distrusted them. Therefore, for instance, a conference of the members of the Russian Communist Party in Homel passed the following resolution in October 1919:

"The advance to the South and the organisation of Soviet administration in Ukraine are possible only with the aid of regular disciplined troops, who, in any case, must not be of local origin" (*Annals of Revolution*, No. 6: Kharkov, 1926, p. 4).

669 The Soviet Russian troops, after having seized the Ukrainian
661 territory until the spring of 1920, began at once the struggle against

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER III

UKRAINE UNDER SOVIET RUSSIAN RULE SINCE 1920

1. The Soviet Régime in Ukraine 1920—21

[656] 668 186 After the resolutions of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party and Lenin's letter to the Ukrainian workers and peasants announcing a new approach to the Ukrainian problem (December 1919; January-1920) the policy of Moscow towards Ukraine did not change in substance. Soviet Russia did not trust even the Communists of Ukrainian nationality or those Russian Communists who wished to meet the Ukrainian national demands even partly. The group of Communists-Federalists headed by G. Lapchinsky published in February 1920, a pamphlet entitled *Project of a Resolution on the Party Policy.* The authors of this pamphlet protested against the rule of the Russian element in Ukraine. They wrote on the "mad, and, for the cause of the revolution, disastrous plan of the occupation of Ukraine by the military and political forces of Soviet Russia. After the enslavement of the Ukrainian nation in the times of the Romanovs and Hapsburgs, every attempt to direct the fate of the country f r o m o u t s i d e will arouse the growth of nationalism".

[665] In the pamphlet, facts on the full dependence of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the Central Committee of the Russian CP are quoted: thus the Communist organisation in Ukraine — "had to fulfil all demands of the Central Committee of the Russian CP, even, if it regarded them injurious to the cause of the revolution in Ukraine".

656 666 Moscow deported the opposing Communists from Ukraine or expelled them from the Party. The Soviet Russian régime in Ukraine thereto was strengthened. For this purpose Moscow gave preponderance to the Russian element in the Soviet administration in Ukraine. For instance, the election system for the 4th Congress of the Soviets in Ukraine in 1920 was the following: from 1000 soldiers of the Red Army one deputy was elected, from 10,000 workers one deputy, and one deputy from 50,000 peasants. It should be remembered that 1920 in the ranks of the Red Army in Ukraine

there were 85% Russians and only 8% Ukrainians. With this election system the representatives of the peasants, the most numerous part of the Ukrainian population, made only 12,7% of the members of this Soviet Congress. Finance, national economy, railways, labour — concisely all foundations of the economic life of Ukraine — were concentrated in Moscow. All Ukrainian co-operative organisations were subordinated to Moscow. During 1920 Ukraine had to deliver to Russia 160 million of Pud of grain (1 Pud is 36 lbs.), 6 million Pud meat, 30 million Pud potatoes, 255 million eggs, big consignments of sugar, etc. The Russian Red Army made requisitions for its needs separately and confiscated in the last months of 1920 about 30 million Pud grain in Ukraine (*Collection of Reports of the Government of the USSR:* Kharkov 1921).

No wonder that in consequence of this exploitation the Urkrainian partisan movement was spreading. At the end of 1920 there were not less than 40,000 Ukrainian partisans in Ukraine who fought against the Russian Communists as an organised force. Evidence of the extent of this struggle is given to us in the trophies of the Soviet Russian troops seized in the war with the Ukrainian partisans 1920—21: 43 guns, 1,812 machine-guns, 31,788 rifles etc. (*Collection of Reports*). In the course of only one year, 1921, the Soviet Secret Police in Ukraine suppressed 6,000 partisan organisations. (*Communist:* Kharkov, February 11, 1923).

2. The Famine of 1921/22 and the Policy of Soviet Russia in Ukraine

The Soviet Russian Government took advantage of the horrible famine of 1921/22 in Ukraine and succeeded in strengthening its rule there. A drought in the fall of 1920 and spring 1921 was followed by a bad harvest, and a great dearth of food arose. A real famine began. However, the policy of the Russian Government in Ukraine, intending to get as much food as possible, did not change. Before the outside world the Russian authorities tried to hide the hunger catastrophe in Ukraine, and directed all foreign aid coming from America and Western Europe into Russia. Though in Ukraine in autumn 1921, millions of the Ukrainian population were starving the Russian Government, nevertheless, took away from the hungry regions the rest of the food stocks, and exported them to Russia. This roused the attention of foreigners who stayed at that time in Ukraine. The American historian H. H. Fisher writes in his book on the famine of 1921/22 that the representatives of the Soviet Russian Government demanded resolutely that it was

731 "necessary to request the ARA (American Relief Administration) not to split its forces, *but to concentrate them entirely on the Volga area*" (p. 248).

Professor Fisher remarks in his book:

"The policy of the Communist Party with respect to the Ukraine famine presents many curious aspects. Not only did the Moscow Government fail to bring the Ukrainian situation to the knowledge of the American Relief Administration as it did other regions much more remote, but it actively discouraged... anything likely to bring the Americans in contact with the Ukraine... Before the ARA had begun its operations (January, 1922) the Moscow and the so-called Kharkov Government did not undertake anything serious for the aid to the hungry people of Ukraine". (H.H.Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia:* New York, 1927). Further, Prof. Fisher says in his book:

"From the first the Moscow Government had discouraged all proposals which tended to bring the ARA into contact with the Ukraine. Litvinov (at that time Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, *P. F.*), had described the port of Odessa, back in the fall of 1921, as out of the question for ARA operations, although it was subsequently used very successfully. It is also significant that, until the ARA had investigated and established outposts in the south, Moscow virtually ignored in its press the famine conditions along the Black Sea..." (p. 252).

731 656 437 Prof. Fisher states that the Russian Communist Government exported food from the hungry regions in Ukraine:

"It is astonishing enough that these trainloads of food have been loaded in Kiev and Poltava and sent hundreds of miles to the hungry along the Volga, instead of being transported a score or so miles across the Gubernia line to Odessa or Nikolaiev, where there was a first class famine in swing. It is even more astonishing, when one learns... that Odessa Gubernia, with a crop of only seventeen per cent of normal and with people dying of hunger in the streets of its principal town as well as in the huts of its villages, sent sixty-five cars to Central Russia, while Nikolaiev, with a crop only four per cent of normal, and containing in the city of Kherson the most desperately afflicted spot in South Russia, in fact, one of the worst in the entire country, sent eight cars to the Volga" (p. 261).

On the export of grain from Ukraine during the famine of 1921/22 the American historian brings the following facts:

"The Gubernia of Podolia produced a considerable food surplus. The adjoining Gubernia of Odessa had a deficit, and many people were doomed to starve if food were not brought in. According to

the scheme officially outlined for the good of Russia, the surplus food in Podolia should not be used to save the lives of the peasants in Odessa, a few miles away, but should be carried through the starving regions, placed on board a steamer and sold in Hamburg . . ." (p. 323).

A representative of the Relief Committee of Fridtjof Nansen who was in Ukraine at the beginning of 1922 gives the following facts on the famine:

"Eight million souls are starving in the south of the Ukraine, 2½ millions of them have absolutely nothing to eat. A further 2½ millions are feeding themselves on substitutes, such as hay, dried plants, etc., but are not getting any normal meals; three millions have some supplies, but in such small quantities that they will soon be reckoned in the first and second categories. It may be said that before the end of April 7 million souls will come under these two categories. About 700,000 little children who have been brought into municipal asylums do not receive more than one fifth of the normal portion. Child mortality is tremendous. It reaches 50%. In Zaporoje one million souls are litterally starving. 60% are children. Cannibalism is spreading. Ten thousand people die in Zaporoje daily. All the cattle and the horses have been devoured". (*La famine en Ukraine:* Genève, 1922).

The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee gives a picture of the famine in Ukraine as follows:

"The country side is parched, without trees or plants, almost entirely black. The straw of the roofs is being used to nourish men and animals. People relate that they first ate up all dogs, cats, crows that they could catch and then took to the starving cattle, to boot-leather and furniture wood. You hear accounts and find evidence of necrophagy and cannibalism. You speak with people who have devoured their children, their brothers and sisters. You see skeleton-like human forms lying in the peasant's huts, dying, or waiting without hope, to be rescued by death . . . Usually no one takes the trouble, or no one has sufficient energy to bury the dead".

In the time when the Ukrainian people were starving in masses, the Russian Government took care only of the aid for the hungry along the Volga. The representative of the Nansen Relief Committee in Ukraine wrote in his report of 1922:

"At the beginning of this year one could have seen in famine-stricken districts of the Gouvernement Nikolaiev such proclamations: 'Workers of Nikolaiev: Come to the assistance of the famine-stricken of the Volga region!' This happened at a time when this

731 Gouvernement had its own 700,000 sufferers, that is, about one half
652 of the population".

"The measure of misfortune here surpasses all that can be seen throughout the famine-stricken Volga areas", the author of the report on the famine in Ukraine remarks.

The horrible famine in Ukraine aggravated by the special 'hunger policy' of Soviet Russia helped the Russian Communists to destroy the partisan movement in Ukraine and to strengthen their rule.

3. Ukraine in the Time of the 'New Economic Policy' (NEP)

185 In 1921 Lenin proclaimed the 'New Economic Policy' in the
656 Soviet state. From 1922 peasants and small private contractors
[423] were given some facilities. Small landownership was secured for 9 years for the peasants. Instead of requisitions a tax was introduced. Free trade was re-established. In order to appease the masses of the peasants of the peoples oppressed by Moscow, the Communist dictatorship made some concessions for the development of the
[191] national cultures. In Ukraine the Ukrainian language was given rights in schools, administration, in the press and judicature. This was the so-called policy of 'Ukrainisation'.

[631] The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics was proclaimed at the end of 1922 at the Soviet Congress in Moscow. The Communist organisation in Ukraine, consisting of foreign imported elements, particularly insisted upon the strengthening of centralisation with regard to the separatist tendencies of the Ukrainian movement (*Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Ukraine* from October 17, 1922).

186 But there were also voices among the Communists speaking
668 against Russian centralism. Thus, for instance, at the 12th Congress of the Russian CP in Moscow (April 1923) the Ukrainian problem extensively was discussed. The President of the Soviet Government in Ukraine, Rakovsky himself, had, after the experience with Ukrainian resistance, changed his former opinion on the Ukrainian national rebirth as a 'hopeless matter', his own expression in 1919. Now Rakovsky attacked those Communists who did not understand the importance of the Ukrainian problem and followed in Ukraine a policy of Russification. Rakovsky declared at this Co[illegible]ress that the Ukrainian problem belonged to those problems that "promise us a civil war ... I am beginning to fear for the further fate of the Soviet Government ... In Ukraine we succeed only with difficulties in forcing our organisations, carrying on their work in the conditions of a national fight, to understand the national problem. All our national policy in international relations

186 665 Ukraine, demanded that the Communist Party stopped its policy of Russification of the Ukrainian workers. On May 12, 1926, Shumsky declared at a session of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP of Ukraine:

"In the Party, the Russian Communists are ruling, who treat the Ukrainian Communists with distrust and enmity".

In a letter to the Central Committee of he CP of Ukraine of February 1927, Shumsky wrote: "The Ukrainian Communist feels himself indeed a stepson of the Party".

[558] For this 'deviation' the top institutions of the Communist Party resolutely condemned Shumsky. He was deprived of his office and sent to Russia.

656 186 687 A new 'deviation' was detected in the CP of Ukraine in 1928. The Communist Volobuyev showed in his articles that economically Ukraine was a Russian colony. He demanded for Ukraine the securing of a free economic development. Volobuyev published figures which proved that Ukraine was giving Russia almost 1/3 of her incomes without equivalent. He pointed out that Russia was sending workers from Russia into Ukraine, thus artifically creating a majority of Russian elements in the Ukrainian industrial centres (*The Bolshevik of Ukraine*, No. 3: Kharkov, 1928). Volobuyev was punished alike for this 'nationalist deviation'.

186 517 In spite of all these difficulties and hindrances created by the Russian Government for the development of Ukrainian culture, the time of 'Ukrainisation' gave some gains for cultural Ukrainian progress, even in the conditions of the Communist dictatorship: Ukrainian shools — elementary, secondary and academic — had been organised; the Ukrainian Academy of Science developed its work extensively. In a few years of cultural work the cadres of a

[538] new Ukrainian intelligentsia were created. The Ukrainian literary production developed in spite of all obstacles on the part of the Soviet régime. The protest against the oppression of Ukraine by Moscow appeared also in the Ukrainian literature: a trend arose in the Ukrainian literature with orientation towards the free civilisation of Western Europe, against Russian Communist rule (the Communist Khvylyovy). Against such 'heresy' Moscow acted with ruthless repressions.

4. Ukraine in the Time of the First Five Years Plan (1929—1934)

185 The policy of collectivisation and industrialisation started in 1929 with enormous demands on Ukrainian national economy. Moscow used the Ukrainian national economy predominantly for

[1, Alexander Shumsky, Commissar of Education -- Analyst]

871 every teacher in the schools in Ukraine had orders to spread Com-
656 munist propaganda, to fight the appearance of national discontent with the Russian rule by every means, and was obliged to insult the
[814] struggle of the Ukrainian people for liberation. In schools, Ukrainian history was falsely interpreted as well as in literature and in films. For instance, clinging to the tradition taken from Tsarist Russia, the Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazeppa who at the beginning of the 18th century wanted to free Ukraine from Muscovite dependence, has in Soviet historiography the epithet of a 'traitor' and 'reactionary'. But Tsar Peter I. and Tsar Ivan the Terrible, are glorified by Soviet school and science as 'progressive democratic rulers'.

659 The Ukrainian religious life under the régime of Soviet Russian
661 occupation had to suffer from special persecutions. In 1921, in Soviet Ukraine the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Autocephal Church, independent of the Moscow Patriarch, was organised. This Church, headed by its idealistic leaders, the Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier of the Government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1918—19 and others, completed a great task for the cultural and moral improvement of the Ukrainian nation. Moscow attempted to destroy the strong organisation of the Ukrainian Autocephal Church with the help of its agents, but did not succeed in this. Then the Soviet Government ruined by bloody repressions the Ukrainian Church after having destroyed its entire hierarchy and masses of its followers (1929).

661 In connection with the 'General Line' which had placed unbear-
517 able burdens on Ukrainian economy, a mass discontent against
815 Moscow increased among the Ukrainians. The ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression by Russia caused, among the Ukrainian people, a permanent oppositon which appeared in various forms. Therefore, the Moscow Government decided to terrorise the Ukrainian intelligentsia which bore the brunt of the political efforts of the Ukrainian nation. For this purpose a number of trials against the most prominent representatives of Ukrainian science and social life were arranged; the case of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine with the participation of the prominent member of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, Serhy Yefremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, former Premier, Professor Osyp Hermayze and others in Kharkov, in spring 1930. Thousands of innocent people, especially students, perished in the prisoners' cells of the GPU without any trial. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian Academy of Science was exposed to repressions. In place of the imprisoned or expelled members of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, the Communists appointed their own people though without scientific merits,
46 but politically faithful to Moscow.

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the former director of the Ukrainian National Library in Kiev, declared before the purge commission in 1933:

"I am being persecuted, because my name ends with 'ko', because I am a Ukrainian (*The First Results of the Purge:* Moscow, 1934).

6. *The 'Organised' Famine in Ukraine in 1932/33*

The purge in Ukraine was taking place in the conditions of a famine more terrible than that the Ukrainians had known in 1921/22. If the famine of 1921/22 was caused by extraordinary drought and bad harvest, and was only increased by the exploitation of the Soviet Russian Government, the famine of 1932/33 in Ukraine and the North Caucasus was organised by Moscow according to a plan made in advance: on the corpses of millions of Ukrainians the Soviet Russian Government wished to establish its forced collectivisation.

The reaction of the peasants in Russia and Ukraine with regard to the collectivisation was different. The Ukrainian peasant is attached to his own land in another way than the Russian. In Russia the remainder of the primitive 'obshchina', a system in which the whole land belonged to the community, every member of which received at periodical partitions allotments of land according to the number of 'souls' or 'eaters', still existed. For this reason the Russian peasant did not cling to his land, for he did not know how long he could till his allotment. Besides, the peasants in Russia, who were accustomed to obedience during the half of a millennium by the tyrannical régime of the Tsars, obeyed the order of the Soviet Government almost without resistance and went into the collective farms. The Ukrainian peasant, freedom-loving, with a feeling of personal dignity, refused to go into the collective farms, for he rightly regarded them as a worse economic system than serfdom was. Moscow knew the free, inflexible character of the Ukrainians, and organised therefore the famine in Ukraine in order to break the resistance of the peasants. For this purpose all food the Ukrainian peasant population possessed was in the course of 1932/33 taken by force through the Communist administration. These food stocks were exported to Russia or abroad. As the consequence of this a terrible famine began in Ukraine. The well known American journalist W. H. Chamberlin calls it 'political famine'*).

Though rumours about the starving of the Ukrainians went abroad, Moscow stubbornly denied the fact of famine in Ukraine. To prevent the world from learning the true conditions in Ukraine

*) W. H. Chamberlin, The Ukraine a Submerged Nation: New York, 1944.

731 656 the Moscow Government, in 1933, forbade foreign journalists to enter Ukraine.

Back in the summer of 1932 the Ukrainian farmers in Canada addressed the Soviet Red Cross with the proposition to send their grain for gratis distribution among the hungry in Ukraine. But Moscow resolutely refused to accept this gift. The hunger catastrophe of 1932/33 was so great that the population of Ukraine died in masses, and cannibalism and necrophagy spread among the people. The peasants of Ukraine, weakened and decimated by the famine, were forced to enter 'voluntarily' the Soviet collective farms. Though the harvest of 1933 was good, millions of Ukrainians did not live to see it.

The dimensions of the devastations of Ukraine by the famine 'organised' by Soviet Russia were carefully concealed by the Russian Communist Government, and are even now kept secret. Only by chance some foreign correspondents learned about the results of this famine in Ukraine. W. H. Chamberlin writes in his book, *The Confessions of an Individualist:* New York, 1941, on the famine of 1933 as follows:

[486] "There were many rumours of mass starvation, especially in the normally rich farming regions of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. The impression that something very abnormal was taking place in the villages was strengthened by the fact that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had introduced a new rule forbidding journalists to travel in Russia without special permission — a permission which was never granted when Ukraine and the North Caucasus were mentioned as destinations. The official explanation of this ruling would have deserved an international mendacity prize. It was that the presence of foreign correspondents would disturb the harvesting operations . . . The ban on journalistic travel was suggestively lifted after the new harvest had been gathered in — after there had been an opportunity to bury the corpses and to remove the outward signs of the famine —".

The same author writes about his visit to the Ukrainian part of the North Caucasus — the Kuban Region:

"This had been one of the richest and most smiling agricultural regions in Russia . . . There was an amazing lack of domestic animals; one saw none of the dogs that had formerly rushed out barking when we entered Cossack villages. In the first house we entered at random we found that seven members of the family have died of hunger. Three had survived. We did not meet any peasant who did not tell us of the loss of relatives or friends".

On the famine in Ukraine Chamberlin writes:

"Poltava had acquired a particularly bad reputation; more than once we heard in Moscow of the carts that moved through the streets in the early morning, picking up dead bodies ... In Moscow it was easy to glib officials to deny to credulous foreigners that there had been any starvation. In Poltava famine could not be denied, although its extent was minimised ... While we were visiting a village calléd Zhuke, near Poltava, two local officials were carefully steering us into the homes of the petty officials of the local collective farm. Suddenly we decided to go into a house at random. We found a girl of fourteen huddled up on the bench which ran around the wall of the house. Had she a father? Yes, he was at work in the field. A mother? No, her mother and her four brothers and sisters had died during the last winter and spring. And her father, as we found, was still an edinolichnik, a peasant working his own land. Marvellous fatalistic stubbornness of a man who would see almost his whole family starve to death and still refuse to accept the new servitude of the collective farm!" (pp. 154—157).

In talks with the population and the reprensentatives of the administration, Chamberlin learned that in 1933 there had died of hunger in the Poltava region almost 15%, in the district of Cherkasy in Ukraine about 30%.

Stanley Richardson, correspondent of the American 'Associated Press' sent on September 22, 1933, the following telegram from Moscow to America:

"Soviet Russia has this year such a good harvest that a repetition of the undernourishment which had recently caused heavy losses of people and domestic animals is imposible. These losses one could see during a journey lasting a week through Ukraine and the Caucasus, the granaries of Moscow".

Owing to the Soviet censorship, Richardson could not give any figures about the victims of the famine in Ukraine. He quotes only the words of a Soviet Commissar in Ukraine named Asatkin:

"A great number of cattle and horses had perished. An exceptionally great number of peasants left the famine-stricken territory, looking for better living conditions. Many of them did not return" (*Ukrainian Voice:* Winnipeg, 27. 11. 1933).

A correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* who had been in Ukraine in the fall of 1933 gave a report on the Ukrainian hunger catastrophe, according to official Soviet sources:

In 1932 in Ukraine there had been 5,543,000 horses, in autumn 1933 only 2,772,000 remained — loss of 50%; the number of hogs diminished in the same time from 3,472,000 to 1,390,000; the number of sheep fell from 6,652,000 to 1,543,000. The top Communist

officials in Ukraine confirmed to the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* that in this country there had been a great mortality from hunger. Comparing the situation of that time in Ukraine and the North Caucasus with the situation in Russia, the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardin* came to the following conclusion when he said:

"It can be definitely stated that no provinces within a radius of several hundred miles of Moscow experienced the Ukrainian and North Caucasian extremities" (*Manchester Guardian:* October 19, and October 21, 1933).

The correspondent of a Jewish Socialist journal in New York, Lang, gave a description of the situation in the summer and autumn of 1933 in Ukraine: he saw how grown-ups and children were starving to death, he had been in totally depopulated villages where the inhabitants had died of hunger or fled from their homes (*Forwards:* 27. 12. 1933).

The American journalist Walter Duranty 'optimistically' estimated the number of the victims of the famine in USSR in 1933 as 5 million people. Of course, the principal part of these victims were in Ukraine, against which the Russian Communist régime was carrying its special policy of exstirpation.

In consequence of the famine and the repressions in Ukraine, principally men had perished. Therefore for instance, in 1932—33 the women in the collective farms in Ukraine were 60—70% of the total (*Communist:* Kharkov, 26. 1. 1934). The extent of child mortality was shown clearly in 1940; in the fall of 1940, the lack of births in 1932/33 forced the authorities to close parallel classes or abstain from opening first classes in many Ukrainian schools, for there where no children! The consequences of the famine in Ukraine could be seen in the decrease of the cultivation plain of the winter crops in autumn 1933: one million hectars less than in 1930 (*Izvestia:* Moscow, 16. 11. 1933).

Fully to realise the hypocritical policy of the Russian Communist dictatorship in Ukraine, one must add that Moscow tried to lay the responsibility for the famine in Ukraine on the Ukrainian Communists, who, as they pretended, 'had overstepped the Party line'. Many prominent Ukrainian Communists were arrested and shot under the pretext that they had caused the famine in Ukraine as 'agents of foreign capital'.

In the first years of their rule in Ukraine, the Russian Communists dreamt of world revolution and regarded the Ukrainian Western territories under the rule of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia as a bridge for their armed 'march on Europe'. In connection

with this, to a certain degree, was the policy of 'Ukrainisation' directed in Soviet Ukraine: Moscow intended to gain sympathy for the Soviet régime among the population of the Western Ukrainian territories in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. The famine of 1932/33 in Soviet Ukraine roused great distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia among the Western Ukrainians. Therefore Soviet Russia destroyed thousands of intellectuals coming from the Western Ukrainian territories, among them Communists as 'agents who had worked for the money of foreign big landowners and capitalists' . . .

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which was led by General Kornilov, later by Denikin. In the summer of 1918 the Kuban Region fell into the hands of the Russian Volunteer Army. The leaders of this army wished to make the Kuban Region a base for the restoration of Tsarist Russia. Among the population of the Kuban Region and in the State Council a strong opposition to the Russian Volunteers arose. But Russian influence was stronger: under the pressure of Denikin's army an alliance of the Cossack territories — the Don, Kuban and Terek regions — for the fight against the Russian Communists was formed at the end of 1918. Against those Ukrainian Kuban Cossacks who defended their independence the Russian Volunteers used terroristic methods: President of the Kuban State Council Mykola Ryabovol was murdered in June 1919 in Rostov, prominent members of the State Council were arrested and hanged. This terror by the Russian 'Whites' was the reason that the Kuban Cossacks left the front against the Russian Red Army and repealed the alliance with the Russian Volunteers. At the beginning of 1920 the Kuban State Council according to the will of the population took the Government of the Kuban into its hands. Vasyl Ivanys was appointed Premier. The Kuban leaders wished to get rid of the protectorate of the Russian Volunteers and to continue the struggle against the Soviet Russian Army in alliance with Ukraine and the peoples of the Caucasus. But in April 1920, under pressure of the Soviet Russian Army, the Kuban Government was forced to leave its territory and to move to Crimea, where at that time the Volunteers' Army of General Wrangel was. Being pressed between two forces, both of which fought for domination in Russia, the 'Red' and the 'White' Russians, the Ukrainian Kuban Government could not attain any agreement with them and went abroad.

The Kuban Region was occupied by the Russian Red Army. Soviet Russia refused recognition of the Ukrainian nationality in the Kuban Region for a long time, and carried on a Russification line through the school and press. Only on August 30, 1929, the Commissariat of Education in Moscow decided that the literary language of the Ukrainians inside the boundaries of the Russian Soviet Republic was the language of Ukraine.

But even after this the Russian Communist bureaucracy hindered the development of schools among the Ukrainians in the RSFSR. In December 1933, in the Kuban Region and on other territories of the RSFSR, with a Ukrainian population of 7 millions, all Ukrainian schools, press etc. were abolished by order from Moscow. During the collectivisation and the famine of 1932—33 the population of the Kuban Region had enormous losses. Attempts on a rising

were cruelly suppressed by Russia: large masses of the Kuban population were deported to Siberia.[1]

6. The Ukrainians in Siberia and the Far East

The lack of land on their own territory forced the Ukrainian peasants to move behind the Volga, the Ural, and into the regions of Siberia. This movement of settlers developed especially after the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway at the end of the 19th century. Thus, large territories behind the Volga, the regions of Samara, Astrakhan, in Central Siberia, the regions of Tomsk, Omsk, Akmolinsk, in Turkestan and in the Far East, the Amur and Sea Region — the so-called Green Quoin, were colonised.

Before World War I in the Green Quoin about 500,000 Ukrainians, mostly farmers, were numbered. At that time a Ukrainian national movement began: educational organisations, bookshops, theatre performances etc. (centre Vladivostok). After the revolution of 1917, in the Far East, Ukrainian cultural, national, political and other organisations were created, and Ukrainian periodicals appeared for the first time. In June 1917, the 1st Ukrainian Far East Congress was called, which decided to demand national autonomy for the Green Quoin, a territory the size of Italy. The 2nd Ukrainian Far East Congress created the 'Ukrainian Far East Secretariat' for the administration of Ukrainian political affairs of the Ukrainian population of the Far East. The Japanese occupation of 1920—22, the war of the 'Red' and 'White' Russians for the Territory of the Green Quoin, did not forward the development of the Ukrainian national movement there. After having taken possession of the Far East, the Russian Communists were hostile to the Ukrainian movement, and hindered especially the development of Ukrainian schools. Though the demands for the introduction of the Ukrainian language in schools for the Ukrainians of the Far East and Siberia came from the Ukrainian population itself and from the Commissariat of Education of Soviet Ukraine, the Russian bureaucracy did not recognise the Ukrainian language, declaring that this was "a separate group of Russian population speaking a special jargon" (Z. Ostrovsky, *The Problems of Ukrainisation and Byelorussianisation in the RSFSR: Moscow*, 1931, p. 33).

7. The Ukrainian Emigration to Europe and America between the World Wars

In consequence of the occupation of Ukrainian territory by Soviet Russia and Poland in 1920, a great number of Ukrainian emigrants

[1] [During collectivization and famine in the Kuban region and the RSFSR 1932-33 -- Analyst]

Ukrainian problem has remained from old times for Soviet Russia the basic problem of its internal and foreign policy. The unceasing Russification policy against the Ukrainians is carried on by particularly cunning methods: the Ukrainian language is not yet abolished definitely in the offices of Soviet Ukraine. But that official who speaks Ukrainian also in his family and in private relations becomes in the eyes of the Soviet authorities suspicious, and has to suffer repressions.

The Communist theory of the national problem worked out by Lenin preaches the 'fusion of nations'. Basing on this, the Russian Communist Government is trying to 'fuse' the nations of the Soviet Union with the Russians. Against peoples who oppose forced Russification, ruthless repressions are used by Moscow. Even the mentioning of the national rights of the non-Russian peoples is condemned in the USSR as 'bourgeois nationalism'.

There is a great principal difference between the situation of the Russians and the peoples united by force with this state: though the Russians are not satisfied with the Communist dictatorship, they do not, however, feel national oppression. Even in the new anthem of the USSR it is said that this state was rallied by Great Russia. We can state the efforts of Russian political groups opposing the Communist régime to maintain the rule of the Russian state over the territories conquered by Soviet Russia, even after the eventual fall of the Soviet régime.

As a curious fact we can quote the view of the well-known Communist L. Trotzky, who was assassinated in Mexico during World War II, on the Ukrainian problem. Trotzky demanded in 1939 the full separation of Ukraine from Russia. But Trotzky thought of an independent Ukraine in the form of a Soviet Republic. This naturally deprived his thesis of all seriousness, for Trotzky needed the slogan of an independent Ukraine only as a political argument in polemics against Stalin (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 77/78, 1939).

As the facts prove, the Ukrainian nation has to endure the heaviest oppression in the USSR. Unfortunately, the words of the famous historian of France Charles Seignobos written in 1913 on Ukraine, can be used emphatically to describe the outstanding feature of the present state of the Ukrainian nation: "Here is the most oppressed nation" ("Voici la nation la plus opprimée", *Les Annales des Nationalités:* Paris, 1913).

In its equalising policy, the Soviet Russian Government retains, also, traces of the Tsarist régime in the affairs of Church and religion. Thus, after having seized Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine dur-

ing World War II, the Soviet Government abolished the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church by force, against the will of the population, and destroyed the hierarchy of this Church. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics who were in union with Rome were ordered to become subordinate to the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow, who is backed by the Soviet Government.

The struggle of the Ukrainians against Russian imperialism did not cease after World War II. It is being conducted in various forms. In this struggle other peoples who are oppressed by Russia, from the Baltic Sea to the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkestan, participate. Thus a common front of freedom-loving peoples against despotic Russia is being created.

In 1949, Moscow has permitted Ukraine to use an own flag and an own different anthem. However, this cannot be regarded an extension of the rights of Ukraine in the Soviet Union. It seems to be more an attempt to bring the so-called satellite countries to the Ukrainian level.

Moscow is watching attentively every expression of Ukrainian political thought and national sentiment, and wants to have everything under its control. The Decade of Ukrainian Culture held in Moscow in July 1951, ended with rebukes and threats against the participants of the Decade, and a 'purge' among the Ukrainian Communists whom Moscow imputes 'bourgeois nationalism'. Only the Russian Communists have beeen beyond any doubt as regards their 'internationalism'; there was no case that the manifestations of nationalism among the Russian Communists had been condemned by the Communist Party. On the contrary, Moscow is cultivating an exaggerated national pride among the Russian people. The Ukrainian Communists are under a especially heavy control of Moscow. No Ukrainian has been General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. This position has always been occupied by people sent from Moscow: Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, Khrushchev, finally Melnikov.

'Titoism' is no isolated phenomenon in the relations between imperialist Russia and Yugoslavia. Similar trends hostile to Russian imperialism have existed among Ukrainian Communists since the first days of Soviet Russian occupation in Ukraine. The Russian terrorism prevented these trends, however, from getting strong. Nevertheless, they exist clandestinely. Moscow's persecution of 'burgeois nationalism' among the Ukrainian Communists gives an eloquent proof of Ukrainian opposition against Russian imperalism.

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under Tsarism, but a long road had to be travelled before all children would have an opportunity to attend schools. Buildings would have to be constructed, teachers trained, text-books written and published. The Ukrainian government first endeavored to provide "elementary" or four-year schools for all children from eight to twelve years of age, then to expand these schools into "incomplete middle" or seven-year schools, and finally to replace these with "complete middle" or ten-year schools; and, in the meanwhile, the government established technical schools and higher educational institutions to train engineers, doctors, actors and other types of "socialist cadres." This quantitative growth of the school system was matched by its growth qualitatively, as measured from the point of view of the language policy. In spite of the shortages of teachers knowing Ukrainian and the languages of the other minorities, the almost complete absence of text-books in these languages, and the appearance of considerable opposition on the part of political leaders, of teachers and even of parents, the Russian language was gradually replaced as the medium of instruction by the other languages.

As early as March 1919 an order of the Commissariat of Education of the newly re-established Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared that the Russification policy was abrogated; that the Commissariat would aid in the development of the long-repressed Ukrainian language; and that "in view of the elimination of a governmental language as such, and of the declaration that all local languages are equal, the Commissariat of Education gives the local population the right to determine in which language teaching must be carried on in the schools, safeguarding simultaneously the interests of [other] national groups."[10] Wherever the language of instruction remained Russian, a second language — also chosen by the local population itself — was to be taught as a special subject. In September 1920 this provisional order was strengthened by a law of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars. The law instructed the Commissariat of Education to draw up a plan for schools of all grades and categories with Ukrainian as the language of instruction.[11] Ukrainian was to be studied as an obligatory subject in all teacher-training institutions and was to be used as the language of instruction in some of them. The law also ordered the Government Publishing House to issue "a sufficient quantity of text-books as well as *belles-lettres* and other publications in the Ukrainian language."

1921), pp. 3–6; *Zbirnik Uzakonen ta Rosporiadžen Robitničo-Seljanskogo Urjady Ukraini za 1924 rik*, 1924, part 1, sec. 271, pp. 800–803; Sojuz Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.S.R., *Pjatyysesojuznyi S'ezd Sojuza Robotnikov Prosveščenija S.S.R. Stenografičeski Otčet* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 172–174.

[10] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1919, sec. 260, p. 347.

[11] *Ibid.*, 1920, part 1, sec. 509, pp. 712–713.

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During 1923 and 1924 several laws designed to provide elementary education for all children specified that this education was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated, and in the languages of the "national minorities" (minorities within the Ukrainian nationality — Poles, Germans, Jews, Czechs and so forth) wherever these minorities formed compact groups.[12] The laws outlined a series of practical measures to make this rule effective: teachers knowing Ukrainian were to be assigned to schools in which they were needed; text-books and other reading materials in Ukrainian were to be increased; pedagogical schools and courses were to be transferred to Ukrainian; pedagogical journals were to be Ukrainized; and all classes for teaching illiterates and semi-literates, except those for the non-Ukrainian minorities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian. Provision was also made for the obligatory study of Ukrainian as a separate subject in all schools being conducted in other languages.

These laws gave impetus to the process of Ukrainizing the "general" (elementary, incomplete middle and middle) schools; and the process was aided by the presence of many nationalists who had formerly opposed the Soviet régime but who had been pardoned and put to work in the Commissariat of Education. In 1923, according to a newspaper report, 47 percent of the general schools had been Ukrainized, while plans had been made to provide the Ukrainian pupils with Ukrainian schools by 1925.[13] During the years from 1923 to 1925 the realization of these plans was proceeding most effectively in the rural areas, where the largest proportion of the Ukrainian population was to be found. In the province of Kharkov, for example, 20 percent of the general schools in the school year 1923–24 were still using Russian and 49 percent were "mixed schools" — schools using Russian in some classes and Ukrainian in others; but 69 percent of the schools in the city of Kharkov were still using Russian exclusively.[14] A picture of the manifold difficulties encountered in this transitional period was presented by the district of Krolevetski in the province of Chernigov.[15] In 1924 instruction in the elementary schools was supposed to be given in Ukrainian; but a majority of the teachers hardly knew the language, and they actually used a jumble of Ukrainian and Russian. In the middle schools the situation was worse: a majority of the teachers not only did not know Ukrainian, but considered themselves exempt from learning it because they had been former

[12] *Ibid.*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–899; 1924, part 1, sec. 272, p. 801; 1924, part 1, sec. 300, pp. 932–933.

[13] *Visti* (organ of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Executive Committee), Oct. 28, 1923.

[14] *Ibid.*, Oct. 26, 1923; see also *ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1924. [15] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1924.

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teachers in the gymnasium and therefore possessed "higher qualifications"; and these teachers showed "active or passive resistance" to Ukrainization. In this district, as in many others, the complaint was made that the schools lacked Ukrainian text-books and other such reading materials.[16]

These difficulties were gradually being overcome. By 1924 the publication of text-books and children's literature in Russian had almost ceased in the Ukraine, and the publishing houses were concentrating on Ukrainian materials.[17] Ukrainian was being taught in all pedagogical schools and teacher-training courses.[18] The results of this step were apparent in 1925. In Chernigov province, for example, 67 percent of the teachers had mastered Ukrainian, and the proportion of Ukrainian schools — which then stood at 54 percent — was being raised as rapidly as the teachers who had recently learned Ukrainian could be transferred to the districts where they were needed.[19]

During 1925 and 1926 the whole process of Ukrainization was raised to the status of a "high-pressure (*udarnaja*) campaign. "Attention was directed even to the *crèches* because, as one writer explained, the early years of a child's life are of the utmost significance in his linguistic development.[20] But a report from Chernigov in 1926 stated that the teachers were agitating among the peasantry against the Ukrainization of the schools; they were "striving with all their forces to discredit the Ukrainian language, to arouse the peasants to adopt resolutions against Ukrainizing the schools, and so on."[21] This was denied by the school officials in the region from which the report emanated,[22] but similar items of news came from other regions. One writer cited a specific teacher in the Don Basin: although she was supposed to teach the Ukrainian language as a separate subject, she could hardly speak it and she referred to it as "a terribly ugly and crude language."[23] Another reporter, again from Chernigov, produced evidence to illustrate the hostility of both parents and teachers: because of this hostility a region with an overwhelmingly Ukrainian population contained thirty-five Russian schools, one Ukrainian and one mixed school.[24]

[16] See *ibid.*, Mar. 4, 1924, Mar. 5, 1924.
[17] *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1924. [18] *Ibid.*, Oct. 28, 1923.
[19] *Kommunist* (organ of the Central Committee and of the Kharkov Provincial Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine), Mar. 21, 1925.
[20] *Proletarska Pravda* (organ of the Kiev Regional Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine, of the Kiev Regional Executive Committee and of the Kiev Regional Trade-Union Council), Aug. 26, 1926.
[21] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926. [22] *Ibid.*, July 25, 1926.
[23] *Ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1926. [24] *Ibid.*, June 2, 1926.

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However, the Ukrainization of education slowly approached its goal. It is impossible to determine the actual number of Ukrainian children studying in Ukrainian schools, for the school statistics contained only the total number of children studying in Ukrainian, Russian, Polish and other schools; and while some Ukrainian children studied in non-Ukrainian schools, many non-Ukrainian children studied in Ukrainian schools. However, an approximate idea of the extent of Ukrainization can be gained by comparing the proportion of school children in Ukrainian schools with the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population. According to the school census of December, 1927, ten years after the Bolshevik Revolution, 75.8 percent of all pupils in elementary schools were in schools conducted entirely in Ukrainian; 6.9 percent were in schools in which some classes were conducted in Ukrainian and some in other languages; and 10.6 per cent were in Russian schools.[25] As the Ukrainians in 1927 were estimated at 80.1 percent of the total population and the Russians at 9.2 percent, the elementary schools might be considered to be nearing the goal of Ukrainization. The seven-year schools, then the predominant type of middle schools, lagged behind the elementary schools because they were relatively more numerous in the Russianized cities; of the pupils in these schools, 60.7 per cent were in Ukrainian schools, 14.7 percent in mixed schools and 15.5 per cent in Russian schools.

In some places, particularly in some cities, the Ukrainization policy overshot its mark. Whereas the Ukrainian population of Kiev was estimated at 41.1 percent of the total population in 1927, 49.8 percent of its school children were attending Ukrainian schools, 5.9 percent mixed schools and 30.6 percent Russian schools.[26] The proportion of pupils in Ukrainian schools was also greater than the proportion of the Ukrainian population in Odessa and Dnepropetrovsk. This situation, as shall be noted below, was regarded unfavorably by some writers in the newspapers, but the charges of "over-Ukrainization" received little attention from the government until after 1933. During the period from 1923 to 1933 the government was concentrating its efforts upon suppressing Russian nationalism and upon providing the Ukrainian and other non-Russian nationalities with schools conducted in their own languages.

In this period much attention was also given to the Ukrainization of technical and higher educational institutions, but in these institutions the lack of teachers knowing Ukrainian, of text-books and of good-will was an even greater handicap than in the Ukrainization of

[25] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini na 15 Grudnja 1927 (Peperedni Pidsumki Škilnogo Perepisy)*, Kharkov 1928, pp. 20–21. [26] *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

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the general schools. As early as 1923 the government ordered the gradual Ukrainization of various technical schools ("technicums," "workers' faculties," etc.) and of higher educational institutions (medical, art, pedagogical, engineering and other "institutes").[27] Vacancies in their teaching and administrative staffs were to be filled preferably with people knowing Ukrainian; some courses were to be conducted in Ukrainian immediately; all students were obliged to study Ukrainian history, literature, economic geography and language; Ukrainian dictionaries and lists of Ukrainian equivalents for Russian scientific terms were to be issued in order to hasten Ukrainization. After the promulgation of this law the process of Ukrainizing technical and higher educational institutions proceeded under the constant prodding of the Commissariat of Education;[28] but by the summer of 1926 only a small proportion of these schools were considered fully Ukrainized, the chief obstacle being that the faculties did not know Ukrainian: in Odessa and Kharkov, for example, only six percent of the professors in the higher educational institutions had mastered that language.[29] At this time the Central Committee of the Party stepped into the picture and ordered an intensification of efforts to Ukrainize these institutions.[30]

A lively flurry of activity to bring the technical and higher schools into line followed the Central Committee's directive, which was passed along by the local committees.[31] The Commissariat of Education ordered the Ukrainization of all technical schools, except those serving national minorities, by the beginning of the school year 1927–28.[32] The Scientific-Pedagogical Society of the Ukrainian Academy of Science held a series of conferences to improve the teaching of the Ukrainian language, literature and history; to work out and distribute lists of Ukrainian scientific terms; and to establish Ukrainization courses for faculty members.[33] Finally, the Ukrainian government took a long step toward the Ukrainization of these schools when its basic statute on education, adopted in 1927, formulated a series of definite rules pertaining to technical and higher schools.[34] All students entering these institutions were to be examined in their knowledge, unless they had graduated from Ukrainian middle schools. Professors, other teachers and scientific workers were to possess a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials, and

[27] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1923, part 1, sec. 430, pp. 896–897.
[28] E.g. *Kommunist*, Mar. 6, 1925; Mar. 20, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926.
[29] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 6, 1926. [30] *Ibid.*, June 26, 1926.
[31] This was done, for example, by the Kiev Regional Committee of the Party.—*Ibid.*, July 15, 1926. [32] *Ibid.*, July 14, 1926. [33] *Ibid.*, July 4, 1926, July 22, 1926.
[34] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . ., 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–628.

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no professor or other teacher could be appointed unless he could conduct his courses in Ukrainian.[35] Institutions for scientific research and for preparing research workers, including the universities, were to be conducted in Ukrainian; and candidates for degrees in such institutions were not to be accepted until they had passed an examination in that language.

Progress in Ukrainizing the technical and higher educational institutions was indicated by the school census of 1927. The Ukrainian language was used for instruction in educational establishments embracing 14.2 percent of the students in the higher institutes, 33.7 percent of the students in the technicums and 47.4 percent of those in other types of technical schools.[36] Although the actually Ukrainized institutes and technicums were not numerous, many of the others were then undergoing Ukrainization. Establishments using both Ukrainian and Russian contained 74.8 percent of the students in the institutes, 43.7 percent of those in the technicums and 33.3 percent of those in other types of technical schools. Only 7.1 percent of the students in the institutes, 17.7 percent of those in the technicums and 13.7 percent in other technical schools still studied exclusively in Russian.[37]

After 1927 the process of Ukrainization proceeded steadily, but in 1929 the Party and the government still regarded the condition of the higher and technical schools pessimistically. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, stated that a considerable part of the teachers and professors in these institutions were hostile to Ukrainization;[38] and newspaper reports bore him out. In Odessa, for example, Professors Tolstoi and Demetz refused to teach in Ukrainian and considered that all lecturers who did so were "renegades."[39] In 1929 the Commissariat of Education was forced to rule that all students intending to graduate from higher educational institutions would first have to pass an examination in the Ukrainian language equivalent to that demanded of government officials.[40]

[35] Only students and professors coming to the Ukraine from other republics were to be permitted additional time to fulfill the requirements.

[36] *Statistika Ukraini. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51. In this period technicums were classified with higher educational institutions rather than with other types of technical or "professional" schools, which were in turn classified as middle schools. The other technical schools included "workers' faculties," "workers' evening professional schools," "schools of the working youth," "long-term courses," "schools of brigade apprenticeship," and "trade-union schools."

[37] This data was given in a speech by Kossior, published in *Proletari* (organ of the central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the Ukraine and of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions), July 17, 1930.

[38] *Ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1929.

[39] *Komsomolec Ukraini* (organ of the Central Committee of the Leninist Communist Union of the Youth of the Ukraine), Mar. 16, 1929.

[40] *Proletari*, Apr. 25, 1919.

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At this time, when the whole problem of Ukrainizing the highly Russianized Don Basin and other industrial regions in the Ukraine was being attacked, the failure to Ukrainize the school system was frequently mentioned.[41] Even a directive of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, in January 1930, stated that in the industrial regions only the schools for general education and for extirpating illiteracy had been Ukrainized; and the directive ordered the Commissariat of Education to examine the faculty members of the technical and higher schools on their knowledge of Ukrainian, and to take steps to insure that these people possessed such a knowledge.[42]

During 1930 and 1931 the reports on the Ukrainization of technical and higher schools were limited largely to items of "self-criticism" which pointed out obstacles or found fault with specific institutions and individuals. The professors in the Medical Institute in Kharkov now knew Ukrainian, but the process of Ukrainization was being retarded by the lack of Ukrainian text-books.[43] In the Lisenko Theatrical Institute in Kiev the classes were conducted in Ukrainian, but the reporter complained that extra-class work was still being carried on in Russian.[44] An investigation of the Institute of Consumer Coöperation and of the Veterinary Institute revealed that the majority of the students still spoke Russian among themselves and that two professors of the former institution refused to instruct their classes in Ukrainian.[45] Both professors and students in the Construction Institute and the Chemical Institute were reported to be hostile to the use of Ukrainian: one of the professors had been discharged for this reason, and the students had declared Ukrainization to be proper only for the middle schools. Because the library lacked Ukrainian books and only three of the hundred and twenty-two journals received were in Ukrainian, the administration of the Chemical Institute was upbraided for opposition to Ukrainization.[46] The Textile and Mining Institutes were also cited as examples of the failure to Ukrainize properly.[47]

The years up to 1933 constituted the high-pressure period of Ukrainization; after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon suppressing the tendency to "over-Ukrainize," where such a tendency was discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had already appeared. This was not a new pol-

[41] E. g., *Komsomolec Ukraini*, May 16, 1929, June 26, 1929.
[42] *Proletari*, Jan. 3, 1930. [43] *Ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1930.
[44] *Proletarska Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1931. [45] *Ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1931.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 30, 1931. [47] *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1931.

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icy; it was, rather, a change of emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and particularly for the Russian inhabitants of the Ukraine.

The Ukrainization of education, it has been noted, was not intended to apply to schools in areas where there were members of non-Ukrainian nationalities living compactly. On the contrary, the educational policy anticipated that every child should have an opportunity to study in his or her mother tongue. This was stated in all of the important legislation on the languages in the school system, beginning with the preliminary order of the Commissariat of Education in 1919.[48] A law of 1924 had altered the rule on the required size of classes, in order to facilitate the establishment of small schools serving scattered groups of the minority peoples.[49] Other laws and directives in the period from 1924 to 1928 contained clauses ordering increased funds for general and technical education for the minorities, the preparation of teachers for their schools and the publication of textbooks in their languages.[50] Steps were frequently taken by the Commissariat of Education to expand the network of schools serving these peoples.[51] The Commissariat contained a special Council of National Minorities, consisting of Jewish, Latvian, German, Polish, Bulgarian, Czech and Moldavian bureaus; and the provincial departments of education had inspectors for minority education, sometimes separate inspectors for German, Jewish, Polish or Czech schools.[52] Finally, the Communist Party itself, through its directives and the speeches of its leaders in the period from 1924 to 1928, constantly warned that during the process of Ukrainization the interests of the minorities were to be protected.[53]

Efforts to provide schools for the minorities received much publicity between 1924 and 1928. Only a few reports can be cited. In

[48] See especially *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1919, sec. 260, p. 347; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, pp. 626–627. See above pp. 129–130. [49] *Ibid.*, 1924, part 1, sec. 300, p. 933.

[50] E. g. *Visti*, Dec. 10, 1924; *Kommunist*, July 3, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 8, 1928.

[51] E.g. *Visti*, Mar. 9, 1925; *Proletarska Pravda*, July 23, 1927.

[52] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1925, part 1, sec. 218, p. 587; 1925, part 1, sec. 285, p. 10; 1926, part 1, sec. 106, p. 221.

[53] E.g. the directive of the Central Committee of the Party in *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925; the resolution of the Kiev Regional Party Committee in *Proletarska Pravda*, July 15, 1926; the speech of Liubchenko (chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars) in *ibid.*, May 11, 1926; speeches of Kaganovich (secretary of the Central Committee of the Party) and of Skripnik (Commissar of Education) and the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Party in *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bil[illegible]ikiv) Ukraini, 20–29 Listopada 1927 p. Stenografičnii zvit* (Kharkov, 1928), pp. 126, 444, 574; the resolution of the All-Ukrainian Council of Trade-Unions in *Proletarska Pravda*, Apr. 7, 1928.

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Chernigov the school assigned to the Jewish language — which in the Soviet Union means Yiddish rather than Hebrew — was using that language even before the schools for Ukrainian children were using Ukrainian.[54] A report from Kiev described a campaign undertaken to draw Polish students into the Polish Pedagogical Institute, into the Polish departments of the technical schools, and into other Polish educational units.[55] In the meanwhile, the Jewish Pedagogical Institute in Kiev was being moved into a new building provided by the Commissariat of Education, and elementary schools were being established for Czechs and Assyrians.[56] Dnepropetrovsk reported that its German school was being enlarged.[57] The city of Kharkov found it could not open a school for Koreans (!) because no teachers were available, and the Kharkov City Committee of the Party asked the Vladivostok City Committee and the Communist University of the Toiling East to supply a few Korean teachers.[58]

No evidence that Kharkov ever succeeded in opening a Korean school has come into the hands of the author; but in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. complimented the Ukrainian Republic on its attention to the educational needs of the minorities; and the school statistics for 1927 indicated that a considerable number of children of the minorities were studying in their own languages. Of all the pupils in general (four and seven year) schools, 2.9 percent studied in Jewish schools; 1.4 percent in German schools; 0.9 percent in Polish schools and 0.8 percent in schools using other minority languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Tartar, Swedish, Greek, Assyrian and Moldavian.[59] Schools using both Ukrainian or Russian and some other language or languages embraced 2.1 percent of all the pupils. Since Jews composed 5.4 percent of the total population, Poles 1.6 percent, Germans 1.4 percent and other minorities 2.1 percent, it is evident that many of the children of the smaller nationalities went to Ukrainian or Russian schools. This fact can probably be accounted for in part by the lack of buildings and teachers, by the scattered distribution of the smaller minorities and by the indifference of the smaller nationalities themselves. The Jews, for example, have tended to assimilate into the Russian nationality in the large cities and into the Ukrainian nationality in the smaller towns and villages. The younger generation of Jews favor Russian or Ukrainian as their social language, and many Jewish parents prefer to put their

[54] *Visti*, Oct. 2, 1924.
[55] *Proletarska Pravda*, July 24, 1926.
[56] *Ibid.*, Aug. 14, 1926.
[57] *Ibid.*, July 19, 1926.
[58] *Kommunist*, May 21, 1925.
[59] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini . . .*, pp. 20–25.

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children into Russian or Ukrainian schools. One reporter in 1933 gave evidence to show that some Jewish parents had desired their children to attend non-Jewish schools, but that pressure had been brought to bear upon them by zealous officials to send their children to the Jewish schools newly constructed for them.[60]

As an illustration of the attitude of the children themselves, an experience of the author may be pertinent. Upon visiting a Jewish school in Kiev, he observed that some of the pupils were carrying Russian text-books; and to the enquiry as to whether no Yiddish books existed for those subjects, several pupils replied: "Oh, yes; but we like to read the Russian texts better than the Yiddish." The school happened to be located in the old Jewish section of Kiev, and undoubtedly the children were sent to this school either because they spoke Yiddish at home (but not amongst themselves) or because of the superior facilities offered by a new institution; and if they had been able to decide for themselves, it is possible that many of these children would have chosen to attend Russian or even Ukrainian schools. Russian is the language of a culture stronger than the secular non-Hebrew culture conveyed by the Yiddish language in the Soviet Union; Russian is also the language spoken in Moscow and generally throughout the U.S.S.R.; and all those pupils, and parents, too, who ever expect to move freely about the Union must have complete mastery of the Russian language. What is true of the Jews is also true of the Poles, Germans, Czechs and others.

That the children of the minorities had to master the Russian and Ukrainian languages if they desired to continue their education on the higher levels is indicated by the nature of the technical and higher educational institutions in the Ukraine. It was impossible to set up an electrical engineering institute for a handful of Poles or Assyrians, or to establish every type of higher educational institution for the Jews. Hence, as the statistics for 1927 indicated, most of the technical and higher educational institutions taught in Ukrainian, Russian or a mixture of the two. Of the students in the lower technical schools (technical schools other than technicums) only 1.4 percent studied in Jewish schools, 0.1 percent in Polish schools, 0.3 percent in German schools, 0.1 percent in the schools of other minorities, and 3.0 percent studied in schools that had one or more of the minority languages together with either Russian or Ukrainian or both.[61] There were no institutes using exclusively the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian minority languages, although 3.9 percent of the students studied

[60] *Proletarska Pravda*, Mar. 29, 1933.

[61] *Statistika Ukraina. Narodnja Osvita na Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–51.

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in institutes that conducted part of their work in Russian or Ukrainian and part in other languages. Of the students in the technicums, 1.5 percent studied in technicums using the Jewish language, 0.5 percent in those using Polish, 0.7 percent in those using German, 0.5 per cent in those using other non-Russian minority languages, and 0.5 percent in technicums using Russian or Ukrainian and one or more of the other languages. These figures do not signify that the Jewish, Polish or German children were deprived of a chance to study in technical and higher schools; on the contrary, the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian student body in these establishments, as will be noted below, was relatively larger than the Ukrainian and Russian student body.

The work of establishing schools using the languages of the smaller nationalities continued after 1927; in fact, it was given additional impetus by the campaign of 1933–35 against nationalist influences in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education. But before examining the effects of this campaign, it is necessary to note the attitude toward Russian schools. At the core of the process of Ukrainization was the transformation of Russian into Ukrainian schools; and it was not surprising that there appeared in at least some areas a tendency to deprive the Russian-speaking population of an opportunity to study in Russian schools. This was, to be sure, not at all the intention of the government. In its decree in expanding general education, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee ordered that "special attention be directed toward assuring schools with instruction in the Russian language for all children of the Russian nationality."[62] But, as has been noted above, the proportion of pupils studying in Ukrainian schools in some places — especially in the larger cities — was greater than the proportion of Ukrainians in the population. A writer in *Proletarska Pravda* (*Proletarian Truth*) claimed in 1926 that the general schools in Kiev were being over-Ukrainized.[63] He was answered by another writer, who argued that whereas the criticism was based on an examination of the number of *schools*, there was still a larger proportion of *classes* being held in Russian than the proportion of Russians in the total population; and the second writer denounced the first for bringing grist to the mill of the enemies of the Soviet national policy.[64] The criticism was proven correct by the school statistics for 1927; but since the process of Ukrainization was in full swing and since at this time the Party considered the Russian nationalists

[62] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1926, part 1, sec. 453, p. 1246.
[63] *Proletarska Pravda*, Oct. 2, 1926. [64] *Ibid.*

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in the Ukraine more dangerous than the Ukrainian variety, no additional attention was given to the problem of Russian children.

In 1933, however, the offensive against Ukrainian nationalism occasioned a review of the Ukrainization process. Ukrainian nationalism had been considered a dangerous force since 1926, when Shumskii and Khvilovoi — two important figures in the Ukrainian Commissariat of Education — were censured for desiring "to orient Ukrainian culture on capitalist Europe rather than on socialist Moscow." The Party became still more alert to signs of nationalism after the uncovering in 1929 of the Society for the Emancipation of the Ukraine, a secret organization headed by such outstanding nationalists as Efremov, Germaize and Nikovskii. But it was the campaign against the collectivization of agriculture which occasioned the intensive campaign against the nationalists. The Party regarded the opposition to collectivization as the result in large part of the nationalists, and it set out to remove them from every branch of political, economic and cultural activity. The central figure in the campaign was Nicholas Skripnik, an "Old Bolshevik" who was accused of having fallen under the influence of his nationalist colleagues and was removed from his position as Commissar of Education in March 1933. Even before his removal, however, the Commissariat of Education and all of its activities were under fire.

Charges of over-Ukrainization of the school system were first launched in an editorial appearing in *Kommunist* (the organ of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party) in February 1933, and reprinted in other newspapers. The editorial said: "The mistakes and perversions in realizing the Ukrainization of the schools led in a considerable number of places to neglecting and ignoring the interests of the national minorities and especially the needs and requirements of the Russian toiling masses living in the Ukraine. Among responsible circles of the Commissariat there was concocted the 'theory' that the majority of the children in the cities, small towns and other labor centers speak a mixed Ukrainian-Russian jargon, and that therefore the majority of these children should study in the Ukrainian language. As a result, a significant part of the Russian toiling masses were deprived of schools in their native language and actually subjected to the forced Ukrainization which the Party had condemned in all of its directives."[65] Shortly after this editorial appeared, an article in *Proletarska Pravda* stated that in Kiev only 49 percent of the Russian children and 30 percent of the Jewish children studied in schools conducted in their native languages; that although

[65] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1933.

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some of the others studied in mixed Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-Jewish schools, they were "mechanically transferred" after the first four years to classes using Ukrainian.[66]

Zatonski, who replaced Skripnik as Commissar of Education, stated that the Ukrainization of Russian children had taken place in Kharkov and in the Don Basin as well as in Kiev; and he pointed to Krasnolutzki District, where the number of Russian schools had dropped from twenty in 1930 to twelve in 1932.[67] He also declared that in Kherson and Makiivitz there were no Russian elementary schools at all; and that in some places there had been a voluntary Ukrainization of Russian children because the buildings and equipment provided for the Russian schools were greatly inferior to those of the Ukrainian schools.[68] Additional evidence was forthcoming in 1934 and 1935 to show some enforced Ukrainization of Polish children and of those of other minorities, as well as of some of the Russian children; and this situation was denounced as an example of "deliberate nationalist wrecking."[69]

This campaign against over-Ukrainization, however, was not intended to lead to a revival of the Russification policy. Kossior, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was adamant on this point. He explained in 1933 that the results of over-Ukrainization would have to be eliminated because this was demanded by internationalism, "by the brotherly interests of the toilers of all the nationalities in the Ukraine."[70] But, he went on, the Russian nationalists would not be allowed to take advantage of mistakes already committed in order to reverse the policy of Ukrainization; on the contrary, there would be a further drive for "Bolshevik Ukrainization." A similar view was taken in 1934 by Postishev, the assistant secretary of the Central Committee and the official most actively engaged in hunting down the Ukrainian nationalists.[71]

According to the latest available material, the Ukrainization of education has kept pace with the expansion of general education, and a greater proportion of pupils were studying in Ukrainian schools in 1937 than in 1927. By 1937 the general schools embraced 5,364,800 children as compared with 1,678,100 in 1913 — an increase of 319 percent over the pre-War year; and whereas twenty-two of every thousand people attended elementary school in the Kiev Educational District in 1912, in 1937 the figure for all of the Ukraine had risen to

[66] *Ibid.*, Mar. 29, 1933. [67] *Visti*, May 1, 1933. [68] *Ibid.*, Aug. 23, 1933.
[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1934 (speech of Zatonski); Aug. 22, 1934, Jan. 5, 1935.
[70] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4, 1933. [71] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23, 1934.

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schools for the years after 1927; and one might conclude from the lack of such figures in the important statistical collections that Ukrainization has ceased or has been reversed. However, this conclusion would not be consistent with the continued stress on the preparation of "Ukrainian cadres," which was the primary purpose of Ukrainizing these institutions. The need for Ukrainian engineers, agronomists, writers and scientific workers was emphasized both by Kossior and by the resolution of the Thirteenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1937.[76] Kossior, moreover, stated that there had been a large increase in the number of Ukrainian professors, instructors, scientific workers and candidates for higher degrees. Finally, the number of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technical and higher schools had grown absolutely and relatively. Between 1927 and 1936 the total number of students in the technicums had increased from 29,300 to 133,300; in the workers' faculties, from 7,400 to 53,500; and in the institutes from 28,200 to 108,200.[77] The increase for the technicums was 455 percent, for the workers' faculties 722 percent and for the institutes 384 percent. In the meanwhile, the proportion of students of Ukrainian nationality in the technicums had risen from 58.0 to 75.3 percent; in the workers' faculties from 57.9 to 65.0 percent; and in the institutes from 48.8 to 53.7 percent.[78] The number of students from among the minorities had increased absolutely but had fallen relatively. Since the increasing proportion of the students were Ukrainians (probably chiefly graduates of Ukrainian general schools and therefore favorable to and easily adaptable to courses conducted in Ukrainian), and since the number of Ukrainian faculty members had risen, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the process of Ukrainizing the technical and higher institutions had continued even after the intensive campaign against the nationalists was undertaken in 1933.

As for the obligatory study of the Ukrainian language in the schools of the other nationalities — provided for in laws of 1920 and 1927[79] — no change has taken place. An order of the Commissariat of Education, issued in December 1940 and just received by the author, clearly indicates this fact. The order is designed to facilitate the study of Ukrainian by children who have come from other republics and, having entered non-Ukrainian schools, are handicapped in the study of

[76] *Visti*, May 30, 1937; June 6, 1937. [77] *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 133.

[78] The percentages for 1927 are taken from *Desjati Z'izd Kommunističnoi Partii (Bil'shovikiv) Ukraini* . . . , pp. 48–52. The percentages for 1936 are from *Socialistična Ukraina* . . . , p. 152.

[79] *Zbirnik Uzakonen* . . . , 1920, part 1, sec. 509, p. 713; 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626.

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this subject.[80] Declaring that the mastering of Ukrainian is obligatory for these children as well as for all other pupils in non-Ukrainian schools, the order states that the younger ones shall be sent to lower grades to study Ukrainian; the older ones may continue along with their classmates, and are to be marked leniently in this subject; and all are to be given special assistance in their study of Ukrainian so that by the time they graduate they may be able to fulffill the requirements demanded of the other pupils. Hence, the campaign against nationalism has not altered this aspect of the Ukrainization policy.

Perhaps the most significant result of the campaign against the Ukrainian nationalists was the effort to point up the importance of the Russian language and the value of Russian culture for the Soviet Union's minorities. One aspect of this effort was the greater emphasis placed on the study of the Russian language in the non-Russian schools of the Ukraine. A thorough mastering of Russian, regarded as a "second" and not as a "foreign language," had long been intended by the Party leaders, and had been provided for in the legislation on education. The important law on the Ukrainization of education in 1923 stated that "because the Russian language has all-governmental and all-Union significance and because it joins the Ukrainian people to the culture of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the study of Russian as an obligatory subject was to be retained in all Ukrainian schools.[81] In the schools of the non-Ukrainian minorities in the Ukraine, either Ukrainian or Russian was to be selected by the population as a subject for obligatory study. The basic statute on education issued in 1927 went still further: both the Ukrainian and the Russian languages were to be taught as obligatory subjects in *all* schools.[82] In explaining the purpose of this clause, Skripnik stated that "now — since the proletarian revolution — the Russian language, once a language of oppression, is the language in which are written the works of Lenin; now the Ukrainians regard it as a brotherly language containing great revolutionary compositions; and in order that after leaving school the Ukrainians may be able to make use of Russian culture, the Russian language is taught as an obligatory subject."[83] This statement, coming from the Commissar of Education, was of considerable importance; but it was later revealed that interest in the Russian language had been lost in the whirl of Ukrainization.

[80] *Zbirnik Nakaziv ta Rosporiadžen Narodnogo Komisariaty Osviti Ukrainskoi R.S.R.*, 1940, sec. 355, p. 14. [81] *Zbirnik Uzakonen . . .*, 1923, part 1, sec. 430, p. 900.
[82] *Ibid.*, 1927, part 1, sec. 157, p. 626. [83] *Proletarska Pravda*, May 9, 1926.

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In 1933 Zatonski censured the nationalists in the Commissariat of Education for neglecting the teaching of Russian which, because it was the means of all-Union communication, "should be taught in all the Ukrainian schools and in the schools of other nationalities."[84] But the real interest in the teaching of Russian appeared in 1937 and 1938, when the Commissariat was again over-hauled. During these years there was another intensified drive against Ukrainian nationalism, as well as against other varieties of opposition to the Party's policies and against every manifestation of inefficiency. Even Zatonskii was removed from his post. And while the renewed attack on nationalism in general was proceeding, a large amount of criticism was directed against the Commissariat of Education for its neglect of the Russian language as a subject of study. The critics — one of whom was E. N. Postnikova, a teacher and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. — stated that because of "the wrecking activities of the bourgeois nationalists," there was a higher percentage of failures in the courses on Russian language and literature than in any other subject.[85] In the first place, not enough time was being allotted to the study of Russian. Secondly, there was a dearth of text-books and of Russian literature in the school libraries: even such works as Gorki's *Mother*, Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, Goncharov's *Oblomov* and the collected works of Lenin were to be found only in Ukrainian translations. Thirdly, the Commissariat had not devoted sufficient attention to methods of teaching Russian and had failed to provide methodological programs for the guidance of teachers. Finally, the knowledge of Russian possessed by the teachers themselves was entirely inadequate; even the graduates of the pedagogical institutes did not know the language well enough to teach it. Since, the critics argued, the pupils themselves were strongly inclined to study Russian, the Commissariat should provide more thorough preparation of teachers, assign more time for this subject, provide more text-books and more Russian literature.

As a result of these criticisms the re-organized Commissariat provided new programs, several of which are in the hands of the author, and it increased the time allotted to the study of Russian. The number of hours specified for the study of languages during the entire period of attendance in the various types of schools, according to the

[84] *Visti*, Aug. 23, 1933.

[85] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), May 16, 1937; *Učitelskaia Gazeta* (organ of the commissariats of education of the union republics), Feb. 27, 1938, Mar. 19, 1938, Mar. 29, 1938.

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teaching plans for the school year 1939–40, is contained in the following table:[86]

I. Schools with Ukrainian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	1130 hours	1187 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Ukrainian Language	2068 hours	1994 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

II. Schools with Russian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	1130 hours	1147 hours
Ukrainian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Russian Language	2150 hours	2111 hours
Ukrainian Language	955 hours	1022 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

III. Schools with Jewish or Moldavian as the Medium of Instruction

A. *Elementary (Four-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	993 hours	989 hours
Ukrainian Language	196 hours	252 hours
Russian Language	390 hours	429 hours

B. *Middle (Ten-Year) Schools*

	Urban Type	Rural Type
Jewish or Moldavian Language	1383 hours	1350 hours
Ukrainian Language	586 hours	618 hours
Russian Language	1131 hours	1221 hours
Foreign Language	446 hours	446 hours

[86] Narodni Kommissariat Osvita U.R.S.R., *Navčalni plani. počatkovoi ta serednoi školi* (Kiev, 1939) pp. 8–9, 11, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 23. It may be noted that the plan for the rural elementary schools contained 36 more hours and for the rural middle schools 54 more hours than was assigned to the corresponding urban schools.

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In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both with and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosveščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

IV UNRRA ASSISTANCE TO THE UKRAINE

Distribution of UNRRA Supplies

UNRRA supplies for the Ukraine are handed over to the government at the port of entry (usually Odessa on the Black Sea); and the government is then responsible for arranging distribution.

Like most other countries receiving UNRRA help, the Ukrainian Government has established a special organization to supervise the reception, warehousing, and distribution of all UNRRA goods received. This organization - which has on its staff specialists in food, industrial equipment, agricultural rehabilitation, food processing machinery, medical supplies, transport, accounting and distribution - is called the Department of UNRRA Supplies, and is directly responsible to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers.

The Department (headed by Mr. V.V. Khomyak) works in close liaison with the various ministries of the Ukrainian Government, and with the UNRRA Mission. On the basis of decisions made by the particular ministries concerned, it draws up plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies and keeps a central record of their sales and of the proceeds expended by the government for further relief projects.

Most UNRRA shipments for both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have arrived through the port of Odessa; and since early 1946 an UNRRA officer has been stationed there to handle problems connected with delivery. Before an UNRRA shipment comes in, the authorities at Odessa are notified of the ship's name, its expected time of arrival, and the nature of its cargo. As soon as possible after the ship lands, discharging of cargo begins. Stevedoring labour is supplied by the port commander's service organization, "Inflot", which also furnishes checkers to work in the ship's hold and on the docks, counting the supplies and reporting any damaged goods. As the cargo is unloaded, perishable items, such as clothing and cheese, are placed in warehouses on the docks, and seeds in a warehouse in the suburbs of Odessa. Packaged goods, such as canned meat, army rations, and juices, are piled on the dock at shipside and finally into freight cars.

Directives for the distribution of the supplies (based upon decisions of the recipient ministries concerned) are issued by the Department of UNRRA Supplies to the Ministry of Foreign Trade representative in Odessa, whose office then instructs the railroad and barge authorities, providing such information as the name and location of the organization or governmental authority receiving the supplies, and a description of the goods to be delivered.

UNRRA relief supplies are either sold to individual ration-card or permit holders, or distributed to collectives, co-operatives, and other